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 The research aim was to examine differences in housing needs during disasters 
according to homeownership type by examining unmet housing needs in Texas during 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. This dissertation includes: (1) literature review regarding 
differences in housing needs by housing tenure normally and during disaster phases; (2) 
decision-making models and methods to handle incomplete tertiary data; (3) patterns of 
unmet housing need differing through disaster phases; and (4) factors determining 
likelihood of unmet housing needs for renters vs. owners before, during, and after 
Hurricanes Katrina–Rita. The longitudinal and logistic analyses used “real-time” reports 
of unmet housing needs logged in Texas’ 2-1-1 dataset covering all 254 counties during 
8/1–12/31/2005.  
 First, previous research has shown that renters faced greater housing struggles 
than homeowners due to their limited resources in phases spanning from prior to a 
disaster to post-disaster recovery. Second, a systematic algorithm was developed to solve 
missing data problems in merging multiple tertiary datasets. This method would enhance 
opportunities to employ tertiary data for research and management studies, at the same 
time increasing the validity of the findings for more appropriate planning and policies. 
Third, in this study during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, unmet housing needs were 
mostly financial issues for rental housing. The volume of unmet rental housing needs 
rose one week after each hurricane’s landfall compared to homeowner’s unmet needs 




response but extended beyond typical hurricane emergency periods. Fourth, greater 
affordability constraints were significantly associated with greater likelihood of rental 
needs prior to and during disaster emergency phases but not during recovery; however, 
greater affordability constraints increased the likelihood of homeowner needs only 
during normal phase prior to the disasters. Less availability of housing was strongly 
associated with greater likelihood of housing needs for both renters and homeowners. 
Housing quality was not associated with unmet needs when controlling for availability, 
affordability and disaster location. Overall, this research showed empirical evidence that 
policymakers need to consider developing different strategies and programs based on 
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The purpose of this study was to examine unmet housing needs throughout 
disaster phases as well as the likelihood of housing needs experienced by renters vs. 
homeowners. Using the 2-1-1 Texas dataset collected during Hurricanes Katrina and 
Rita, types of unmet housing needs were recorded in “real time” across Texas’s 254 
counties. Then the type of housing was enumerated for renters vs. homeowners, 
aggregated by county, and examined to compare factors accounting for their likelihood 
of unmet housing needs varying across disaster phases. The five-month study period was 
divided into four disaster phases, including a month baseline prior to Hurricane Katrina, 
Katrina emergency management, Rita emergency management, and short-term recovery 
up to 14 weeks post-landfall of Hurricane Rita.  
The research for this dissertation was reported in four papers, each written for 
publication submission: Chapter II) review of literature about differences in housing 
needs experienced by renters and homeowners during disasters; Chapter III) report of the 
method developed to handle missing data when merging tertiary datasets; Chapter IV) 
discussion of unmet housing needs recorded for 2-1-1 callers to the Texas Information & 
Referral Network (TIRN) over the five-month study period (Fall 2005) and across Texas’ 
254 counties that include disaster sites as well as evacuation destinations; and Chapter V) 




housing needs for renters vs. homeowners for each disaster phase. The final chapter is a 
brief summary and conclusion of the findings as well as recommendations for planners 
and policy makers and for future research.  
 This project was funded by the Department of Homeland Security’s Science and 
Technology Division in collaboration with the Texas 2-1-1 Information & Referral (I&R) 
Network and United Way Worldwide. The author was involved throughout the study, 
playing a key role in data cleaning and coding, analysis, reporting, and development of 
other related presentations and publications. This set of four papers regarding unmet 




 In 2005, over a million Hurricane Katrina evacuees were displaced from their 
homes to other cities or states (Godoy, 2006). Three weeks later, Hurricane Rita 
displaced another 3.7 million people (Eskovitz, 2006), resulting in unprecedented 
housing and sheltering needs. Although housing is a fundamental need before a disaster 
strikes, providing shelter and temporary housing during a disaster is an additional 
societal demand. Often during a disaster, inadequate houses where low-income renters 
live suffer a higher percentage of damage. It is not easy for displaced individuals to find 
affordable housing after a disaster.  
 To date, several studies have focused on housing needs and affordability during 




quality neighborhoods in order to reduce their housing cost burdens. They are likely to 
suffer after a disaster because of the cost of housing damage, trouble finding adequate 
shelter, and problems with finding new low income housing after the disaster has passed. 
Other research has concentrated on a certain time period during disasters, such as shelter 
and housing recovery. However, little is known about housing needs spanning all 
disaster phases as examined in this dissertation. In addition, there have been few 
comparisons made between the needs of homeowners and renters during both normal 
times and disasters. Although housing tenure—whether a household owns or rents the 
unit—is an important characteristic and deeply related to the dweller’s level of 
vulnerability (Burby, Steinberg, & Basolo, 2003; Zhang & Peacock, 2010), it has been 
understudied compared with other population characteristics (e.g., age, gender, race, and 
income).  
Policymakers and researchers seek information about where services are needed 
during a disaster, what types of needs there are and when those needs peak. Although 
there is no perfect set of data that covers these complicated issues, 2-1-1 databases have 
the potential to measure unmet needs of a population experiencing access barriers for 
meeting their needs in broad geographical areas, collected in real time. Merging the 2-1-
1 datasets is challenging given variations in software; however, the coding of needs is 
standardized using the same taxonomy across 2-1-1 call centers. Merging 2-1-1 data 
with other datasets (e.g., Census, HUD) is also challenging but enables the ability to 






 The results of this study will help to identify unmet needs of a vulnerable 
population, as well as a more complete portrayal of the actual demand for housing 
according to disaster phase. Disaster planners and managers may use this approach as a 
template for “real time” analysis of their own local 2-1-1 data to determine types and 
volume of needs during disaster preparation, emergency management, and recovery 
phases. This study focuses on the unmet housing needs that emerged during two 
extensive hurricane disasters—Katrina and Rita—analyzed by disaster phase in a broad 
geographical area throughout all 254 Texas counties. Although Hurricane Katrina did 
not directly affect Texas, evacuation and relocation of its victims is still having an 
impact throughout the state. Hurricane Rita did strike Texas. Thus, the study period and 
area will show the impact of each hurricane on both affected communities and 
evacuation host communities. Consequently, the results of this study will be useful for 
community leaders and policymakers in deciding how to manage assistance efficiently 
during these dynamic and critical stages of community planning.  
 Moreover, with growing research interest in employing tertiary data for studies, 
missing data problems in merging tertiary datasets have become more prominent. This 
study developed a systematic algorithm within the parameters of the nature of missing 
data and the logical sources of the comparative data. The ability to salvage an important 
dataset source would enable researchers to explore a broader variety of tertiary data for 




 Although many studies have focused on distinct factors of disaster housing issues 
such as shelter, temporary housing, or housing recovery, systematic studies related to the 
longitudinal aspects of housing issues during disasters is still limited. This dissertation 
synthesized literature on housing needs during normal times as well as literature 
regarding disaster-related housing needs. The next step was to empirically illustrate the 
empirical patterns of how housing needs changed during disasters. There is also a 
discussion regarding how long it might take to become normal, which provided 
empirical evidence of Quarantelli’s (1982, 1995) disaster sheltering and housing 
typology. The resulting patterns of unmet housing needs may help planners and 
researchers better understand how these needs change when the temporal aspects of a 









CHAPTER II  




 Housing tenure—whether a household owns or rents the unit—will be one of the 
most underestimated aspects of social vulnerability to disasters (Peacock, Van Zandt, 
Zhang, & Highfield, 2014). Housing tenure describes the nature of the relationship 
between the housing unit and the household occupying it. In this way, it captures both 
social (i.e., household) and physical (i.e., housing unit) vulnerabilities. This interaction 
in vulnerabilities manifests itself in a variety of ways during disasters. In this paper, I 
explore the variation in housing needs among owners and renters during disasters. 
 Over the past two decades, researchers have expanded our understanding of 
disaster impacts to include variation based on social factors, rather than just hazard 
exposure and physical vulnerability. Most researchers find that socially vulnerable 
populations have been disproportionately affected by disasters compared to other 
population groups (Bates, 1982; Bates & Peacock, 1987; Blaikie, Cannon, Davis, & 
Wisner, 1994 cited in Peacock et al., 2007; Bolin, 1986; Levine, Esnard, & Sapat, 2007; 
Peacock & Girard, 1997; Quarantelli, 1982). Previous disaster-related studies have 
focused on socially vulnerable populations, for example age (Bolin & Klenow, 1982-83; 
Bolin & Klenow, 1988; Ngo, 2001), gender (Enarson, 1999; Enarson, Fothergill, & 




Pais, 2006; Flynn, Slovic, & Mertz, 1994; Fothergill, Maestas, & Darlington, 1999; 
Peacock & Girard, 1997), and income (Dash, Peacock, & Morrow, 1997; Elliott & Pais, 
2006; Fothergill & Peek, 2004).  
 Among vulnerable populations, housing tenure has been relatively understudied 
to date. Many characteristics of renters are not mutually exclusive to other social and 
physical vulnerable characteristics (Morrow, 1999), which include low-income, 
minority, low quality housing condition (Kreimer, 1980; Morrow, 1999; Peacock, Dash, 
& Zhang, 2007) as well as lack of resources and even its limited control (Van Zandt et 
al., 2012). Compared with owners, renters have limited financial resources (such as 
income, savings) to maintain, improve, and repair their housing (McCarthy, Van Zandt, 
& Rohe, 2001; Van Zandt & Rohe, 2011). While owners have higher levels of ability to 
control housing units and housing security (Rohe, Van Zandt, & McCarthy, 2001), 
renters do not have control over housing units (Burby, Steinberg, & Basolo, 2003; 
Morrow, 1999); for example, renters do not get to decide whether the unit will be rebuilt 
or redeveloped, and have little to no control over their ability to return to the original 
unit, putting them at risk of temporary or permanent displacement.   
 Moreover, many previous studies were focused on a single disaster phase (e.g., 
preparedness, emergency response, or recovery), but rarely spanned all disaster phases 
using the available empirical data. Burby, Steinberg, and Basolo (2003) studied the 
vulnerability issues of renters in terms of threat of disaster and preparedness. Comerio 
(1997) explained housing recovery issues for tenants and homeowners after the 




between housing tenure and recovery patterns from the case study of Hurricane Andrew. 
Mukherji (2010) also reported the housing recovery in India following the 2001 Gujarat 
earthquake by focusing on housing tenure.  
 Compared to owners, renters have a wider range of housing problems that are 
generally more severe during normal periods. They bear an affordable-housing shortage 
problem in the U.S. (Apgar, 2004), which could become worse after disasters. The 
number of affordable housing units was increased about 0.4 million from 2000 to 2005-
07, however units for households under 50% of average middle income (AMI) were 
reduced by about 1.6 million (National Low Income Housing Coalition, 2011). Renters’ 
housing issues include not only housing quantity but also housing condition. The 
condition of housing for low-income and minority households is bad; that is, older, 
poorly built, lacking sanitation, located in vulnerable areas, and less-maintained 
(Kreimer, 1980; Morrow, 1999; Peacock & Girard, 1997). Housing in poor condition is 
apt to be damaged or destroyed during disasters, reducing inventory, particularly for 
low-income households. In the case of earthquakes, housing location is an important 
factor in the impact the disaster will have, along with housing type and the quality of 
construction of low income households (Bolin & Stanford, 1991).  
 This paper is focused on differences in housing needs experienced by renters and 
owners during disasters. To build a framework for understanding how housing tenure 
relates to social vulnerability, I first characterize the differences in characteristics of 




and renters at each stage of disaster. Finally, I discuss disaster housing policies and 
programs for renters and owners.  
  
Social Vulnerability 
 Vulnerability is generally defined as “the potential for loss” (Cutter, 1996, p. 
529), though other definitions have been presented (see definitions of vulnerability in 
Cutter, 1996). Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator (UNDRO) 
(1980, p. 5) defines vulnerability as “the degree of loss to a given element at risk or set 
of such elements resulting from the occurrence of a natural phenomenon of a given 
magnitude.” Several studies have focused primarily on the physical aspects of 
vulnerability, such as biophysicality and the built environment; but recent studies have 
also focused on the social and economic aspects (Cutter, Boruff, & Shirley, 2003; 
Zahran, Brody, Peacock, Vedlitz, & Grover, 2008). Blaikie, Cannon, Davis, and Wisner 
(1994, p. 9) defined vulnerability as “the characteristics of a person or group in terms of 
their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impacts of a natural 
hazard,” which is a way of describing social vulnerability. In 1996, Cutter developed the 
hazards-of-place model of vulnerability, which considers both biophysical and social 
vulnerabilities for place vulnerability. More recently, Peacock and his colleagues (2008) 
discussed that researchers still have different definitions of vulnerability, and they use 
different measurements (e.g. the integration of physical and social vulnerability, “the 
direct consequences of multiple dimensions of vulnerability,” see detail in Peacock et al., 




 Researchers have expressed concern that disasters can reveal and even magnify 
existing pre-disaster social problems such as social inequality (Bolin & Stanford, 1991; 
Greene, 1992). Bolin and Stanford (1991) noted that the success of the overall recovery 
process (including housing recovery) is strongly related to social structure. For example, 
many low income populations face difficulties related to housing shortages before a 
disaster strikes, and after such disasters it only becomes worse; examples include 
Hurricane Katrina (Popkin, Turner, & Burt, 2006) and the Whittier-Narrows earthquake 
(Bolton, Liebow, & Olson, 1993). It is likely that residents have different levels of 
information; financial, social, and physical resources; and the control or power to use 
those resources within their community or society (Van Zandt et al., 2012, p. 32), which 
creates a complex and varied set of situations to consider. Policy makers and 
practitioners continue to pay limited attention to issues of inequality with regards to 
residents’ varied capacities to handle the impact of a disaster. Some populations—the 
elderly, female-headed households, children, the disabled, minorities, and renters—are 
all likely to face additional barriers after a disaster. These socially vulnerable 
populations face a greater likelihood of being affected by disasters, as compared to other 
populations, because of their limited resources (financial, social, and physical).     
 
Differences Between Renters and Owners  
 Housing tenure describes the relationship between the household and the housing 
unit. Ownership conveys bundles of interests or benefits, including both use and 




investment interests (McCarthy, Van Zandt, & Rohe, 2001). Use or consumption 
interests refer to the shelter and accommodation that housing provides, while exchange 
or investment interests refer to the value that housing and land have that can be sold or 
exchanged. These interests have both social and economic impacts that may be relevant 
to a household’s vulnerability (McCarthy, Van Zandt, & Rohe, 2001; Rohe, Van Zandt, 
& McCarthy, 2001).   
 Comparing these differences in characteristics between renters and owners in a 
normal period allows us to understand how these differences may lead to vulnerabilities 
during a disaster. The difference in resources between renters and owners is described 
based on the three distinct types: household resources (age, marital status, life cycle 
stage, employment status, children, income, and race/ethnicity), social resources 
(attachment/stability of neighborhood, and civic participation), and physical resources 
(structure age, overcrowding, maintenance, and location).  
 
Household Resources   
 Life cycle differences, along with mobility, explain many of the differences 
between owners and renters. Younger and unmarried people are more likely to move 
because of changes in their job and/or marital status, as compared to older and/or 
married people with children. Thus the proportion of renters is higher for younger 
households, partly because the relatively low transaction costs associated with renting 
make it a good option for households who are faced with a change in job or marital 




have children are more likely to be owners. Once they settle down with a job, people are 
more likely to decide to purchase a house because they want to secure tenure. As of the 
fourth quarter of 2010, the homeownership rate for households whose age is 65 or over 
was 80.5 percent, which is the highest rate; in contrast, the homeownership rate for 
households whose age is under 35 was 39.2 percent, which is the lowest rate (Callis & 
Kresin, 2011, p. 7). In sum, renters are more likely to be young, single, and childless.  
 Economic factors are also useful when considering differences between renters 
and owners. Renters tend to have lower-incomes than owners (Alexander et al., 2006; 
Belsky & Drew, 2007). A person who is not permanently settled in place or does not 
have the financial resources to buy a home generally becomes a renter (Cutter, Boruff, & 
Shirley, 2003). The median household income of owner-occupied housing units was 
about twice that of renter-occupied housing units (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010). As of the 
fourth quarter of 2010, households with family income above (or equal to) the median 
have 30 percent higher homeownership rate than households with family income below 
the median, (Callis & Kresin, 2011, p. 9). Low-income households are more likely to 
have rentership compared to middle- or high-income households (Apgar, 2004). 
Generally, renters have limited financial resources compared to owners.  
 Finally, race and ethnicity are also important factors for divergence between 
renters and owners (Alexander et al., 2006; Belsky & Drew, 2007). Racial 
discrimination is an ongoing issue for minorities, particularly African-Americans, when 
they buy, sell, and rent a house (Feagin & Sikes, 1994; Guy, Pol, & Ryker, 1982; 




mortgages is lower for African-Americans than it is for whites, even when controlling 
for differences in creditworthiness such as education and income (Oliver & Shapiro, 
1995). Further, Guy, Pol, & Ryker (1982) found that the percentage of African-
Americans in a neighborhood has a significantly negative relationship with the volume 
of mortgage lending. African-Americans (and other minorities) are also likely to have 
more limited housing choices (Sagalyn, 1983)—homes that are in poorer condition 
(Friedman & Rosenbaum, 2004) and located in lower-quality neighborhoods (Flippen, 
2004; Van Zandt, 2007). Due to this poorer neighborhood quality, minorities face higher 
mortgage interest rates and lower home appreciation rates (Flippen, 2004; Oliver & 
Shapiro, 1995). The homeownership rate of Whites was higher than that of minorities 
(e.g., Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians) (Apgar, 2004; Coulson, 1999; Rosenbaum, 1996). 
As of the fourth quarter of 2010, the order of homeownership rates (highest to lowest) by 
race is Whites (74.2%), other races (57.7%), Hispanics (46.8%), and Blacks (44.8%) 
(Callis & Kresin, 2011, p. 8). The differences in homeownership rates among the races 
are closely related to income (Painter, Gabriel & Myers, 2001; Wachter & Megbolugbe, 
1992), education (Painter, Gabriel & Myers, 2001), immigrant status (Painter, Gabriel & 
Myers, 2001), age of owner household (Coulson, 1999; Masnick, 1998), and culture 
(Rohe & Stewart, 1996).   
 Those who frequently move their dwelling may have less information regarding 
hazards in their home location, because of a lower number of social attachments or little 
concern for disaster situations (Burby, Steinberg, & Basolo, 2003). Minorities may also 




a condition which encourages little preparation for a disaster (Burby, Steinberg, & 
Basolo, 2003). Low-income populations often face obstacles finding affordable shelter 
and temporary housing after a disaster. Since they have limited financial resources, 
many must choose public shelters because they lack other options. The situation 
becomes even worse when they seek temporary housing, because rental housing is the 
preferable housing type for a temporary stay; this is likely to increase both demand and 
rent.    
 Further, minorities, particularly those that are low-income, often face inequalities 
when they obtain homeowners insurance, making home purchase more difficult 
(Squires, 1998; Squires, O'Connor, & Silver, 2001; Squires & Velez, 1987). Further, 
these difficulties may also complicate attempts to qualify for loans for housing repair 
after a disaster (Bolin & Stanford, 1998; Peacock & Girard, 1997). Minorities, low-
income, and renters are less likely to receive sufficient support from federal sources in 
the United States than middle-class homeowners (Fothergill & Peek, 2004; Kamel & 
Loukaitou-Sideris, 2004; Mueller, Bell, Chang, & Henneberger, 2011).  
 
Social Resources 
 Owners are more likely to stay in their home and neighborhood longer than 
renters (Goodman, 1974; Roistacher, 1974; Rossi, 1955; Speare, 1970; Varady, 1983). 
Their residential stability is associated with strong attachment to the neighborhood. Also, 
ownership provides the basis for homeowners to become civically engaged (Rossi & 




homeownership often acts as the stake that stakeholders claim. The protection of 
property (and often of property values) becomes a high priority for homeowners and 
motivates many to lobby for their neighborhood and property interests. Thus, owners are 
more likely to be politically active in the community (Ahlbrandt & Cunningham, 1979; 
Blum & Kingston, 1984; Cox, 1982; Guest & Oropesa, 1986; Lyons & Lowery, 1989; 
Rohe & Stegman, 1994; Rossi & Weber, 1996). Rossi and Weber (1996) found that 
there are some different political behaviors between owners and renters; for example, 
owners were more likely to be interested in public affairs, serve on a committee or as an 
officer for a local improvement group, attend conferences of local improvement groups, 
and donate money to local improvement groups. Recently, Manturuk, Lindblad, and 
Quercia (2012) reported that homeowners would be involved in a neighborhood group 
than renters, although they were less likely to have regular conversations among the 
group than non-mobile renters possibly because of a dwelling type (multifamily housing 
vs. single-family detached housing).  
 Compared to owners, renters are more transient and may be new to their 
neighborhood (Burby, Steinberg, & Basolo, 2003). They are less stable and the 
attachment to their neighborhood may also be low. Neighbors may consider them to be 
transient residents, making them less likely to participate in neighborhood groups 
(Manturuk, Lindblad, & Quercia, 2012). Furthermore, renters are less likely to be 
involved in political behavior (Rossi & Weber, 1996). Morrow (2008) also mentioned 
renters have weak control over community decisions compared to homeowners. 




community decision-making due to both their perceived and real “stake” in the 
community. Homeowners are invested, both literally and figuratively in their 
communities, while renters may not be. Thus their opinions and input may not be valued 
in the same way. 
 This creates a stark contrast between homeowners and renters, where renters are 
seen as not fully citizens (Perin, 1977). Renters, therefore, are not as likely to be 
civically engaged, not as likely to advocate for their rights, and are not as likely to 
generate social and political capital (Rohe, Van Zandt, & McCarthy, 2001) that may 
become important in the aftermath of a disaster. Further, they are less likely to be 
involved in local decision-making; thus their needs and perspectives are less likely to be 
incorporated or addressed. 
 The housing security that comes with ownership provides literal protection from 
weather, from invaders, or from other physical threats. While renters also have access to 
shelter, the rental agreement typically does not convey protection from entry by the 
landlord or maintenance and repair personnel. Renters recognize that someone other than 
themselves ultimately controls who enters the unit and how it is maintained. Security 
also refers to the ability to retain the home. Owners have much stronger rights to stay in 
their homes than do renters. Although through the recent housing crisis, we have seen 
the number of foreclosures skyrocket and forced evictions occur, the process for this is 
much more elaborate and longer than it is for renters. Thus, renters have less control 




those to harden the unit against physical hazards as well as recover from damage that the 
unit may incur. 
 
Physical Resources 
 Differences exist in the physical resources between renters and owners in terms 
of housing condition and its spatial location; homeowners, on average, enjoy larger 
units, newer units, more rooms, private yards, and garage or covered parking, for 
example (U.S. Census Bureau, 2011). The condition of rental housing is generally poor 
in that it is often older, overcrowded, and maintained less. According to the U.S. Census 
Bureau (2004), about 30 percent of rental housing stock was built before 1950 and only 
11 percent during 1990-2003. In the case of resident-owned housing stock, about 22 
percent was built before 1950 and also about 22 percent during 1990-2003 (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2004). Although problems with overcrowding conditions have diminished 
because of smaller family size and larger size per residential unit, there are still issues 
among foreign immigrants who are characteristic of renters (Schwartz, 2006). Rental 
housing units are less likely to be well maintained (Apgar, 2004). From the perspective 
of a property’s preservation, renters have little incentive to keep their property well 
compared to owners. Additionally, renters have little authority to install any safety and 
protection features (e.g., shutters, wind protection, and roofing) that would help the 
housing unit withstand a disaster better (Morrow, 1999). As a result, much rental stock 
faces risk of loss. Peacock and his colleagues have found that renter-occupied single-




family housing) are more likely to experience greater levels of damage and be slower to 
recover after disaster (Peacock, Van Zandt, Zhang, & Highfield, 2014; Zhang & 
Peacock, 2010). 
 Along with the residence’s condition, the spatial location of the property is 
another important issue. Due to a shortage of rental housing, low-income renters have 
fewer choices when selecting their living location, which illustrates a consequence of 
shortages of affordable housing (Schwartz, 2006). Although job locations changed from 
central city areas to suburban areas (Alexander et al., 2006), it is not easy for low-
income renters to afford rental housing in a suburban community because it often lacks 
affordable rental housings due to local regulations (Alexander et al., 2006; Apgar, 2004). 
Thus, low-income renters are more likely to stay in available housing in the central city 
and commute to suburban areas (Alexander et al., 2006). Furthermore, low-income 
renters who live in poor and/or minority neighborhoods faced more problems such as 
crime, low-quality schools, inadequate housing, poor-quality infrastructure, and 
hazardous locations (e.g., floodplains, landfills, toxic waste depots, and areas exposed to 
natural and technological hazards) (Belsky & Drew, 2007; Bullard, Mohai, Saha, & 
Wright, 2008; Morrow, 1999; Phillips, 1993). Overall, many low-income renters have 
little choice about the location or condition of buildings in which they live (Schwartz, 
2006).  
 Figure 2.1 shows the relationship between resources linked to tenure and how 
they might affect the ability of residents to respond to a disaster. It shows that their 




example, renters generally have low financial resources and therefore experience 
problems finding temporary housing after a disaster, whereas owners have more ability 




Figure 2.1. Relationship between renter and owner resources and the ability to     
respond to a disaster  
 
Differences in Ability and Disaster Response between Renters and Owners during 
Disasters 
 The differences between owners and renters may have a real impact on the ability 
of renters to anticipate, prepare for, respond to, and recover from a disaster. For 
example, renters cannot entirely control their dwelling in terms of preparing for disasters 




housing units, as was the case with Hurricane Andrew (Morrow 1997a; Morrow 1999). 
Yet owners are able to install shutters or protective roofing, so in certain ways they can 
be better prepared for a disaster. After a disaster, low income renters face difficulties 
concerning both temporary and permanent housing, because they cannot decide whether 
or how soon their dwelling will be repaired, or when they can return to their original 
dwellings. Furthermore, during a recovery, renters have little power to control any 
decisions related to the greater community (Morrow 2008).  
 To review these differences, I organize the literature according to disaster phase. 
Although the typology of disaster phases has some issues, it has been widely accepted as 
a standard by many researchers. Researchers and practitioners should understand that 
each disaster phase is not mutually exclusive, meaning phases are not clearly distinct 
from one another (Neal, 1997). This issue was mentioned in an earlier study by Haas, 
Kates, and Bowden (1997) and Quarantelli (1982). While some victims stay in shelters, 
others seek temporary housing or immediately repair their homes. Researchers and 
practitioners might want to identify the objective—not subjective or social—time 
periods of disaster phases. However, each household, group, or community may 
experience different disaster phases for varied lengths of time because individuals face 
different levels of barriers. Earlier studies have concerned the ‘social time’ aspect—for 
example, Dynes (1970) cited in Neal, 1997; Haas, Kates, and Bowden (1977); 
Quarantelli (1982). Phillips (1991) found that the transition time from shelter to 
permanent housing for both the elderly and Hispanics is much longer, for instance, than 




 Notably, researchers have been developing the disaster phase classification since 
the 1930s (see detail in Neal, 1997). Each study (e.g., Faulkner, 2001; Fothergill & Peek, 
2004; Haas, Kates, & Bowden, 1977; Mileti, Drabek, & Haas, 1975; Roberts, 1994) uses 
a different number of phases, but they fall within four general groups: 1) preparedness 
and warning phase, 2) impact phase, 3) emergency response phase, 4) recovery and 
reconstruction phase. Recovery and reconstruction phases are sometimes separated 
depending on the study, but because the two phases address similar issues in sequential 
time periods, they were combined in this work.  
 
Preparedness and Warning Phase 
 The first phase is the pre-impact or prodromal period, so preparedness behavior 
and warning response can be considered (see for example, Fothergill & Peek, 2004). In 
this phase, residents are anticipating the onset of the hazard, and are undertaking 
preparedness activities, which may include stocking up on foods, evacuating, sheltering 
in place, or battening down. While few studies address housing tenure explicitly, most 
studies indicate that owners were better prepared for a disaster compared to renters. 
Turner, Nigg, and Paz (1986) found that owners were better prepared with emergency 
staples during an earthquake. Burby, Steinberg, and Basolo (2003) focused on disaster 
preparedness during joint natural and technological disasters and found that renters are 
less prepared compared with owners in the study of the Torrance and New Orleans 
refinery disasters. They explained that renters are more likely to move frequently, thus 




communication channel to obtain information. Also, they mentioned renters did not have 
enough financial resources to properly prepare for the disaster. Importantly they insisted 
that “tenure itself may also play a role” (Burby, Steinberg, & Basolo, 2003, p.47), along 
with income, ethnicity, and length of residence. They found that, regardless of income 
level, owners were better prepared for hurricanes than were renters in the study of New 
Orleans.  
 Gladwin and Peacock (1997) described although it was not statistically 
significant, renters are likely to start preparation a little later than owners based on their 
study of Hurricane Andrew. The mean interval between start of preparation and storm’s 
arrival for owners was 1.5 hours longer than that of renters (33.8 hours vs. 32.3 hours) in 
their study. They considered that this insignificant difference represented people’s major 
concern about personal safety compared with protecting property. Moreover, Morrow 
(1997b) pointed out that owners are likely to have had relatives’ help as well as help 
relatives in terms of preparing a disaster. The odds of homeowners receiving kin help are 
about twice as high as those of renters, possibly because homeowners “would have more 
preparation work to do, and, hence, would be more likely to need assistance than would 
renters (Morrow, 1997b, p.145).” In addition, the odds of homeowners helping other 
relatives are about 1.6 times as high as those of renters.  
 
Impact Phase  
 The second phase is the impact phase that is “often the shortest, yet most 




renters is more vulnerable due to low-quality construction (Greene, 1992; Katrakis, 
Knight, & Cavallo, 1994; Phillips, 1993; Rosenbaum, 1996) as well as their housing 
being located in hazardous areas (Bullard, Mohai, Saha, & Wright, 2008; Morrow, 1999; 
Phillips, 1993). Often earthquakes destroyed multi-family housing units (Comerio, 1997; 
Wu & Lindell, 2004) because of the poor housing quality and unsafe location (Bolin & 
Stanford, 1991). The Loma Prieta earthquake caused about 11,500 housing units to be 
destroyed or significantly damaged, and about 60% of them were rental units (Comerio, 
1998). Similarly, the Northridge earthquake destroyed or severely damaged 60,000 
housing units, 88% of which were multi-family housing (Comerio, 1997).  
 In terms of hurricanes, according to Comerio’s study (1997) that reviewed 
residential losses in disasters, Hurricane Hugo destroyed or severely damaged 36,000 
housing units and 11% of these were multi-family units. In the case of Hurricane 
Andrew, 80,000 housing units were destroyed or severely damaged and 29% of them 
were multi-family units (Comerio, 1997). In particular, most subsidized rental housing 
and all public housing in South Dade were destroyed (Morrow, 1997a). Hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita also severely affected rental housing. Approximately 56% of rental 
units in New Orleans were flooded by Hurricane Katrina (Muro, Liu, Sohmer, Warren, 
& Park, 2005), and low income housing was affected the most (National Low Income 
Housing Coalition, 2005). In addition, Hurricane Ike caused the greatest damage in the 
census tracts with high percentages of rental housing (Henneberger, 2009). Although 
most of the studies regarding on impact phase described mortality or housing damage, 




during Hurricane Andrew. The study showed that ownership did not have significant 
impact on the perception after controlling for major home damage, ethnicity, income, 
and being a single mother.   
 
Emergency Response Phase 
 The third phase is the post-impact period, “typically including the first hours or 
days, perhaps up to one week, depending on the event” (Fothergill & Peek, 2004, p. 96). 
In this phase, people are looking for emergency shelters or temporary shelters (i.e., the 
first two phases of Quarantelli’s disaster housing typology). Low-income renters have 
few shelter options due to their limited resources, thus they are more likely to stay in 
public or mass shelters (Mileti, Sorensen, & O’Brien, 1992; Morrow, 1999; Tierney, 
Lindell, & Perry, 2001). Morrow (1997b) found that evacuees selected their relative’s 
homes as relocation places most frequently regardless of income level during Hurricane 
Andrew, but high-income households preferred to stay hotel or motel compared with 
low-income households. In addition, homeownership increased the odds of having 
relatives stayed with them after controlling income, ethnicity, and major damage 
(Morrow, 1997b). This might be because owners have security of their housing units, 
therefore it might be easier for owners to share their dwelling with their relatives 
compared with renters.   
 There are some studies regarding residents’ evacuation behaviors. Gladwin and 
Peacock (1997) found that single-family housing residents as well as low-income and 




Hurricane Andrew. According to these results, it is unclear whether ownership is 
associated with evacuation behavior, because single-family housing residents are likely 
to be owners, but low-income households are likely to be renters. They explained the 
possible reasons why low-income and Black households were less likely to evacuate 
were deficiency of transportation and affordable dwellings, which are more related to 
their financial issue rather than ownership itself. Similarly, Van Zandt and her 
colleagues (2012) pointed out that neighborhoods with higher proportions of renters had 
lower evacuation rates and they were more likely to have stayed later during Hurricane 
Ike. Elliott and Pais (2006) found that there was no significant difference in evacuation 
timing by ownership based on their survey results from the Hurricane Katrina survivors, 
but instead they found strong racial difference. 
 The transition time from sheltering to temporary housing is longer for low-
income households compared to that of high-income households (Phillips, 1993) because 
of insufficient financial resources available to recover housing (Dash, Peacock, & 
Morrow, 1997). Elliott and Pais (2006) found that victims’ post-Katrina sheltering 
situation was related to their homeownership. Their results showed that many owners 
had returned a month after Katrina’s landfall, while renters and boarders were more 
likely to still stay in other’s home, an apartment, hotel, or other temporary shelter.  
 
Recovery & Reconstruction Phase 
 The final phase is the recovery and reconstruction phase. Recovery phase is the 




Peek, 2004; Haas, Kates, & Bowden, 1977; Roberts, 1994). In this phase, people’s life 
returns to fairly pre-disaster routine including services, utilities, and transportation, 
though they might live in temporary housing (Fothergill & Peek, 2004; Haas, Kates, & 
Bowden, 1977; Roberts, 1994). Reconstruction phase is the long-term recovery period 
that spans from one to many years after a disaster (Fischer, 1998; Fothergill & Peek, 
2004; Roberts, 1994). During this phase, community services, homes, jobs and 
population are restored and replaced to pre-disaster conditions or possibly developed 
better; and people come back to their permanent housing (Fothergill & Peek, 2004; 
Haas, Kates, & Bowden, 1977).  
 During the recovery phase, low-income renters have problems finding affordable 
temporary housing (Quarantelli, 1995). Since there was a shortage of affordable housing 
before the disaster, it becomes worse afterward (Bates & Green, 2009; Bolin & Stanford, 
1991; Bolton, Liebow, & Olson, 1993; Kreimer, 1980). Low-income households, 
particularly the poor, are more likely to be in temporary mobile homes, while high-
income households usually prefer to get rental assistance rather than using a mobile 
home (Quarantelli, 1982). After disaster, rents often increased due to high demand of 
temporary housing for both owners and renters (Comerio, 1998; Quarantelli, 1982). 
Even with rental vouchers, it could be difficult for low-income displacees to find 
temporary housing (Green, Bates, & Smyth, 2007).  
 For low-income renters, planning their permanent housing (even whether or not 
they return to their original homes or communities) is another issue. After Hurricane 




than were renters (Elliott & Pais, 2006). Girard and Peacock (1997) also found that 
homeownership showed a negative relationship with relocation after Hurricane Andrew, 
and housing type is related to post-hurricane relocation; residents in single-family houses 
were less likely to relocate than residents of multi-family housing structures. One study 
that was conducted after the 1998 explosions in Israel, however, showed no significant 
relationship between tenure and relocation decisions (Kirschenbaum, 1996). Renters 
were apt to be displaced after a disaster (Peacock, Dash, & Zhang, 2007). Often, renters 
have no control over whether or when the property would be rebuilt. Thus, regardless of 
whether renters want to return to their original property, they might be forced to leave. 
At the same time, renters are less likely to secure their jobs after a disaster (Elliott & 
Pais, 2006) because of unstable employment of low-income workers (Morrow, 1999), 
which is one of the important factors in deciding their permanent housing location. 
Moreover, there is another possible barrier to returning to the original home: eviction. 
Some landlords may not want to receive returning displacees because they want higher 
rents, or alternative housing when they rebuild (Elliott & Pais, 2006). In the case of the 
Whittier-Narrows earthquake that occurred on October 1, the rent-due day, many renters 
were evicted because of failing to pay rent on time (Bolin, 1993 cited in fothergill & 
peek, 2004).  
 Rental housing has experienced a problem with much slower recovery compared 
to owner-occupied homes, particularly in low-income and minority neighborhoods 
(Zhang & Peacock, 2010). In the case of Hurricane Katrina, six months after landfall the 




renters, was reduced from pre-Katrina levels (Frey & Singer, 2006). Two years after 
Hurricane Katrina, the speed of housing recovery in affluent neighborhoods was much 
faster than that in poor neighborhoods, e.g., Lakewood vs. Lower Ninth Ward (Jervis, 
2007). There were about eight percent of housing loss in Lakewood and about 64 percent 
of housing loss in Lower Ninth Ward during the last decade (The Data Center, 2014a, 
2014b). The homeownership rate of Lakewood decreased slightly to 88.4 percent in 
2010, from 91.7 percent in 2000 and that of Lower Ninth Ward increased 66.4 percent in 
2010, from 59 percent in 2000 (The Data Center, 2014a, 2014b). It may reflect that 
housing units in Lakewood have been restored regardless of housing tenure, but the 
restoration of rental housing in Lower Ninth Ward was much less or slower than that of 
owner-occupied housing. As a result, low-income renters might be forced to remain in 
temporary housing longer than owners or even be permanently unable to return to their 
original residence (Quarantelli, 1995).  
 Housing types are also significant factor for recovery speed. Apartments and 
duplex units have slower recovery speed compared to single family housings (Lu, 
Peacock, Zhang, & Dash, 2007; Peacock, Van Zandt, Zhang, & Highfield, 2014). 
Almost three years after the Northridge earthquake, less than two percent of housing 
construction permits for rebuilding were for apartment buildings although roughly 80 
percent of the damaged housing units were multi-family housing and affordable rental 
housing (Wu & Lindell, 2004). Two years after the Loma Prieta earthquake, the single-
family housing was almost rebuilt, however even after five years only half of the 




after Hurricane Andrew, single-family housing was restored in most cases; however, the 
rebuilding of multi-family housing lagged significantly (Comerio, 1997). Even after ten 
years, Miami-Dade County had many housing units that remained damaged (Kershaw & 
Mason, 2005). Likewise, the speed of public housing recovery has been very slow. Five 
years after Hurricane Ike, about 40 percent of homes had been restored, but no public 
housing unit had been rebuilt among the 569 public housing needs to be replaced 
(Wilder, 2013). In late 2014, six years after the storm, two new mixed-income 
(subsidized) developments were initiated to begin replacement of the lost public housing 
units. 
 One of the primary reasons for slow recovery of rental housing is the lack of 
financial resources for housing repairs or rebuilding (Cutter, Boruff, & Shirley, 2003; 
Dash, Peacock, & Morrow, 1997). In the aftermath of disasters, homeowners of single-
family housing who rebuilt their housing used insurance, savings, and commercial loans 
as well as public resources (e.g., SBA, FEMA, and HUD) (Wu & Lindell, 2004). In 
contrast, owners of large apartment properties had little resources—either private or 
public. Comerio (1997) noted that these apartment property owners often have difficult 
situations because they lack money to repair the buildings due to high vacancy rates and 
falling property values, and getting repair loans from the government is usually difficult. 
For example, after the Northridge earthquake, most of single-family homeowners could 
repair damage as well as improve their homes using insurance and disaster assistance 
(Comerio, Landis, Firpo & Monzon, 1996 cited in Comerio 1997). By contrast, multi-




1997). As mentioned earlier, two years after Katrina, the recovery speed of housing in 
rich communities having private insurance and funds was much faster than that in poor 
communities which needs government assistance (Jervis, 2007). Thus, renters struggle to 
stay in adequate shelter or temporary housing until they are able to go back to their 
original dwelling, which usually takes longer than for owners to go back to their original 
dwelling.  
 
Housing Tenure Variable and Social Vulnerability Studies By Disaster Phase  
 Housing tenure has often but not always been used as a study variable—
including owner/renter, homeownership, and single family dwelling—in social 
vulnerability studies (see Table 2.1). Previous research mostly falls within four disaster 
phases: preparedness and warning, impact, emergency response, and 
recovery/reconstruction. For the preparedness and warning phase, three studies (Burby, 
Steinberg, & Basolo, 2003; Gladwin & Peacock, 1997; Morrow, 1997b) include housing 
tenure as an independent variable. For the impact phase, one study (Morrow, 1997b) 
used the housing tenure variable as an independent variable; alternatively, other studies 
did not use a housing tenure variable and described only mortality and damage. For the 
emergency response phase, of the five studies reviewed two studies used the interview 
method, one study did not use housing tenure as a variable, and only two studies (Elliott 
& Pais, 2006; Morrow, 1997b) used homeownership as an independent variable and a 
critical variable. Specifically, in terms of evacuation-related studies, according to 




variable based on actual hurricane evacuation studies published from 1991 to 2012 (see 
Huang, 2014, Appendix A). The study found that homeownership is a strong and 
consistent predictor of a household’s evacuation decisions, and also that homeowners are 
less likely to evacuate (Huang, 2014). Lastly, for the recovery and reconstruction phase, 
among the seven empirical studies, only five studies (Girard & Peacock, 1997; Elliott & 
Pais, 2006; Kirschenbaum, 1996; Lu, Peacock, Zhang, & Dash, 2007; Zhang & Peacock, 
2010) used housing tenure as an independent variable.  
 













Preparedness & Warning Phase 










Tenure*, income, ethnicity, gender, 
children, marital status, length of residence, 
age, education, experience with hazard, 
perceived likelihood of disaster, knowledge 





















Have relatives in area, Black, Hispanic, 
income, single adult, couple, elder HH, 









FL Regression Perceptions 
of stress in 
relationships   
Black, Hispanic, income, minor children, 
single mother, own home, live in South 
Dade, had major damage  
Emergency Response Phase 






LA Regression Housing a 
month after 
the storm 
Black/white, HH income & ownership*, 
gender, age, parental status, condition of 
home 
Note: Case a, b, or c indicates different study within one article or book (using different dependent variables or 
























 FL Regression Relocation to 
relatives  
Have relatives in area, Black, Hispanic, 
income, own home, insured, live in South 










Pre-event earthquake salience, pre-event 
earthquake experience, damage, 
community integration, roles of 
responsibility, age, ethnicity, gender, SES 
























FL Regression Relocation 
patterns 
Black, Hispanic, mobile home, multiple 
units, owner, low income/rent, insured 
owner, insured renter, moderate damage, 
major damage, totally destroyed, eye wall, 
eye 






LA Regression Return 
decision  
Black/white, HH income & ownership*, 
gender, age, parental status, condition of 






Israel Chi-square Relocation 
decision 
Gender, age, ethnic, origin of father, 
immigration year, apartment tenure, 
previous residence, people in apartment, 
health, education, occupational status, 











Year building value, bed room, bath room, 
building age, ownership, #of sales, damage 












Age, bedrooms, baths, hurricane damage, 
tenure, NB's income, ethnic/racial 
composition 
Note: Case a, b, or c indicates different study within one article or book (using different dependent variables or 


























HI Path model Family 
recovery  
Damage to dwelling, weeks out of work, 
education, income, age, use of disaster 
assistance, use of informal aid, use of 










TX Regression Economic 
recovery  
Family size, SES, % damage, age, marital 
status, use of disaster assistance, primary 
group aid, insurance adequacy, aid 
adequacy, HH moves, race 
Note: Case a, b, or c indicates different study within one article or book (using different dependent variables or 
 study areas).  * indicates a critical variable; NB stands for neighborhood; HH stands for household. 
 
Policy Implications  
 As the literature review above makes clear, disasters make previously-existing 
housing problems more severe. Processes already in place in communities become 
magnified and hastened during disasters (Bates & Peacock, 1987; Kates, Colten, Laska, 
& Leatherman, 2006; Morrow & Peacock, 1997; Olshansky, Hopkins, & Johnson, 
2012). Consequently, the outcomes can be generally predicted by pre-existing conditions 
(Peacock, Van Zandt, Zhang, & Highfield, 2014). However, it should be remembered 
that the rate of compression would differ between processes, which can distort the 
relationship between redevelopment and decision processes compared to that in normal 
times (Olshansky, Hopkins, & Johnson, 2012).    
 Low-income households experience shortages of affordable housing stock prior 
to a disaster, and then the stock is further reduced after a disaster (Bates & Green, 2009; 




shortage of affordable housing issues prior to a disaster (Bates & Green, 2009; Popkin, 
Turner, & Burt, 2006). Low-income housing, and in particular multi-family housing, is 
more likely to be damaged during a disaster because of existing housing condition and 
location, therefore increasing the probability that low-income households will face 
problems after a disaster. Thus, during normal times housing policy needs to give more 
consideration to increasing—or at least maintaining—the amount of affordable housing 
stock as well as improving the physical condition of those buildings.   
 Immediately after a disaster, adequate shelters as well as temporary housings are 
needed. Among the options for temporary housing, people prefer rental assistance to a 
FEMA trailer. Naturally, low-income households have a problem paying for rent 
increases and dealing with the lack of housing stock after disasters (Bolin 1993 cited in 
Fothergill et al., 1999). After Katrina, home prices increased in areas other than the 
most-damaged ones, and rent prices also increased for the entire area (Liu, Fellowes, & 
Mabanta, 2006). Moreover, there were also issues related to the landlords’ willingness to 
accept vouchers (Wilgoren, 2005). Thus, rent-control policies are needed for each 
municipality to prevent rental prices from escalating dramatically during the recovery 
and reconstruction phase (Fothergill, Maestas, & Darlington, 1999; Fothergill & Peek, 
2004). Cities, which receive many evacuees, may issue emergency vouchers with funds 
from FEMA, HUD, or state as a temporary housing solution—for example Houston and 
Dallas during Hurricane Katrina (see Popkin, Turner, & Burt, 2006). Moreover, these 
cities may create a program to encourage landlords to admit these vouchers from the 




 For disabled people in particular, more money should be spent on rent assistance 
because they require special accommodations that are more expensive than reflected by 
local Fair Market Rent levels (Fischer & Sard, 2006; Sard & Rice, 2005). Sard and Rice 
(2005) noted that rental assistance from FEMA and HUD was rarely covering the costs 
of utilities unless rental charge included utility. Thus, covering the costs of utilities is 
one way to help low-income households, and it is especially effective during summer 
and winter. Additionally, they suggested that assistance with housing search and also 
relocation assistance are other ways to reduce renters’ burdens. Furthermore, renters’ 
unmet needs need to be considered, and consistent and clear legal interpretations of 
rental assistance programs would be helpful (see detail in U.S. Senate, 2009).   
 For the temporary housing option, rental repair programs could be considered as 
an alternative to FEMA manufactured housing (U.S. Senate, 2009). FEMA trailers take 
time to be manufactured, which requires people to stay in a shelter longer (Davis et al., 
2006). In contrast, rental repair programs could increase rental-housing stock that also 
serves as a good option for permanent housing; overall, it would be a cost-effective 
solution compared to manufactured housing (U.S. Senate, 2009).  
 According to Neal’s (1997) study, after a disaster affects an area, some 
households passed from the emergency response phase to the recovery phase within a 
single month, while other households lagged and remained in the emergency response 
phase during that time. Previous studies show that owner-occupied housing experiences 
much faster recovery compared to rental housing (Zhang & Peacock, 2010), and renters 




Rental housing has often suffered from the lack of resources for repairs and rebuilding 
(Cutter, Boruff, & Shirley, 2003; Dash, Peacock, & Morrow, 1997; Girard & Peacock, 
1997). Prior to a disaster, many large apartment buildings are already in bad condition. 
Owners of these buildings have inadequate or no insurance, insufficient money, and little 
support from government because of complex ownership arrangements that make them 
unable to get a Small Business Administration (SBA) loan (Comerio, 1997, p. 169). 
SBA loans and many FEMA assistance programs are often not applicable to renters 
(Bolin & Stanford, 1998; Comerio, 1998; U.S. Senate, 2009). Thus, relief agencies can 
provide financial aid and other forms of direct assistance to help renters and landlords 
deal with the challenges found within a disaster-stricken market (Burby, Steinberg, & 
Basolo, 2003).   
 Low-income affordable housing is rebuilt very slowly—or not rebuilt all—when 
compared to most other damaged housing. Prior to a disaster, there is usually not enough 
low-income housing, and yet post-disaster it is difficult to rebuild this housing stock 
even to the pre-disaster level. This slow (or lack of) recovery exacerbates renters’ 
financial difficulty. While their original housing is rebuilt or repaired, they need money 
for temporary housing, not only rents and security deposits but also restoration of 
household goods. Considering that renters don’t have enough resources and also that 
their housing recovery time takes longer, they often have severe problems paying for 
temporary housing. Therefore, solutions for displaced individuals and households, 
especially those who are unsubsidized renters (as opposed to federally-subsidized 




other communities or cities that adopt some of these displacees are needed to account for 
people who resettle in other places (Lubell, 2005). More importantly, policy makers 
must plan for improving issues of housing affordability and quality even before a 
disaster as a fundamental solution.    
 Overall, the American housing system provides single-family housing well, and 
yet there are some shortcomings in what it provides for renters. During a normal period, 
housing policies (in particular the tax system) tend to favor owners over renters 
(Krueckeberg, 1999). Similarly, after a disaster, the current system serves single-family 
homeowners, particularly the middle-class, well in terms of disaster assistance to rebuild 
housing (Bolin & Stanford, 1991; Bolin & Stanford, 1998; Comerio, 1998). Likewise, a 
sufficient quantity of affordable housing stock for renters needs to be rebuilt in a 
reasonable time period and providing financial incentives could be one method to help 
ensure that it gets done (Zhang & Peacock, 2010). FEMA (2009) suggests another way 
to do this is to use funds from the Community Development Block Grant program and 
the HOME program to repair and rebuild this housing, in case of single-family rental 
housing, while having agreements that maintain rents at affordable levels to certain low-
income residents. Overall, housing assistance programs need to focus more on renters’ 
unmet needs (U.S. Senate, 2009, p.12) so that federal resources are distributed to the 








 This paper is focused on the difference between renters’ and owners’ housing 
needs before, during, and after a disaster. The previous studies showed that renters lack 
resources from prior to a disaster (preparedness) to post-disaster (recovery). Before a 
disaster, their resources were different, including financial resources, housing condition, 
and housing location. That is, renters’ household, social, and physical resources prior to 
a disaster were limited compared to that of housing owners. Additionally, renters had 
more-severe damages during a disaster. Moreover, during a recovery, renters’ limited 
financial resources (e.g., lack of insurance, and less governmental assistance) (Bolin & 
Stanford, 1998; Kunreuther & Roth, 1998 cited in Peacock et al., 2007) as well as 
limited social and political resources (i.e., less ability to make decisions regarding 
recovery) (Morrow, 1999) causes them to struggle harder and over a longer period of 
time.  
 Although housing tenure is an important vulnerability characteristic, the previous 
disaster-related studies were not much focused on it, but rather were more focused on 
race and income. Additionally, studies usually focused on a single disaster phase, 
whereas this study considers the larger picture of both rental and ownership housing 
needs before, during, and after disasters. This study offers an initial step in developing a 
framework based on housing tenure among social vulnerability studies.  
 There are a few suggestions for the future research. Although this paper provides 
theoretical evidence on the difference between renters’ and owners’ housing needs 




housing needs by housing tenure change throughout various disaster phases. Thus, future 
study should focus on identifying and quantifying daily or weekly housing needs of 
renters and owners before, during, and after a disaster. This study will provide more 
advanced and detailed information to community planners and disaster managers 
regarding how to support renters and owners efficiently throughout various disaster 
phases, based on the understanding of what the specific needs are and when the needs 
peak. Notably, finding data on previous annual patterns (i.e., year-on-year changes) will 
be beneficial to identify/quantify a hurricane’s impact on yearly needs. Furthermore, 
researchers could examine differences between owners and renters regarding which 
community characteristics are associated with their regions’ housing needs before and 
after a disaster.  
 Future research should consider on analyzing housing needs over time and 
location by housing tenure from pre-disaster through recovery. It would be an interesting 
research to map hot-spots over time for specific type of needs (e.g., shelter needs and 
recovery needs). Finally, there is still little research related to housing recovery process 
following a disaster (Peacock, Dash, & Zhang, 2007), which is an important area that 







HANDLING INCOMPLETE TERTIARY DATASETS: CASE OF 2-1-1 
INFORMATION AND REFERRAL MISSING DATA 
 
Introduction 
 Disasters such as Hurricane Sandy in 2012 and Hurricane Katrina in 2005 
devastated coastal regions of the U.S. Policymakers want to know locations where 
services are needed during disasters and when the needs peak so that support can be 
most effective and efficient. For particular disasters, researchers need data that spans 
time and location; however, it is difficult to aggregate data from disparate sources. Even 
if these datasets could be compiled, they may have missing variables or different data 
collection methodologies (e.g., continuous vs. categorical, written detailed response vs. 
summary report).  
 Much has been written about methods to handle missing primary data; however, 
missing data in tertiary datasets remains problematic. Employing secondary data or 
tertiary data (i.e., data from published reports or the results of analysis; Blaikie, 2003) 
saves time and reduces both effort and the cost of research (Kiecolt & Nathan, 1985; 
Sørensen, Sabroe, & Olsen, 1996). According to these authors, it improves external 
validity because of the large study populations as compared to sample sizes typically 
collected in surveys or polls. Yet researchers may not take advantage of tertiary sources 
because of incomplete data. Finding a suitable method to handle missing data when 




reduce bias in their analysis. In this study, we present a method to replace missing data 
for a key variable in one dataset to be merged with several other complete datasets.  
 Caller data from the Texas 2-1-1 Information & Referral (I&R) Network was 
used to investigate the missing data problem when merging tertiary data. Unlike 9-1-1 
for emergency calls, the 2-1-1 phone service helps callers with non-emergency needs 
find health and social support services. The 2-1-1 caller data captured three key variables 
in real-time for analysis of unmet disaster needs over time and location: 1) caller unmet 
needs, 2) call date, and 3) locations where referrals were sought. The study covered a 
five-month period beginning in August, 2005, to capture data about unmet needs during 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita evacuation, disaster response and recovery in Texas. The 
Texas 2-1-1 Network is comprised of 25 regional Area Information Centers (AICs) that 
share referral resource data statewide but maintain independent databases of caller unmet 
needs. Hence, merging these 25 caller databases enabled the investigation of unmet 
disaster needs longitudinally and spatially. However, call date was missing in the dataset 
submitted by the large Dallas metropolitan area call center. Hence, without call date, it 
was expected that there would be significant bias for longitudinal analysis of unmet 
needs by disaster phase unless there was a way to replace the missing data. 
 The specific merged dataset examined below was narrowed to callers requesting 
help for housing or shelter (N=180,601). This subset was about 28 percent of the total 2-
1-1 calls during the study period (N=635,983) and represented the largest proportion of 
disaster needs when compared to health (18 percent), food (15 percent), or transportation 




summary reports listing volume of calls by county by type of need. The Dallas AIC 
served eight counties with a call volume of 124,435 during the 5-month study period, 
second only to Houston’s AIC 2-1-1 call volume. Because the Dallas metropolitan area 
was a major evacuation destination during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, their call data 
would be important to include in analysis of disaster needs over time. Thus, an accurate 
method was needed to replace the missing call date information.  
 This study involved four steps: 1) review types of missing data and existing 
techniques for handling missing data, 2) discuss missing data problems in the 2-1-1 
tertiary datasets, 3) design a method for handling these incomplete datasets, and 4) apply 
the method to a real 2-1-1 dataset. Using this method, the volume of data for 2-1-1 
datasets could be increased approximately 30 percent; therefore, the statistical validity 
increased. Moreover, this new approach for handling systematic missing data could be 
applied to other types of tertiary databases (e.g., 911, hospital records, school records, 
multiple service centers) that may have the similar dilemma of missing a variable in a 
subset of merged data. 
  
Background 
Types of Missing Data 
 Little and Rubin (1987, 2002) defined three types of missing data: missing 
completely at random (MCAR), missing at random (MAR), and not missing at random 
(NMAR). First, for MCAR data, “the probability of missing data on Y is unrelated to the 




3). For example, participants may be absent from a test due to random reasons not 
related to variables in the study, such as relocation or family tragedy (Peugh & Enders, 
2004). Hence, this type of missing data is unbiased. Next, for MAR data, “the 
probability of missing data on Y is unrelated to the value of Y, after controlling for other 
variables in the analysis” (Allison, 2001, p. 4). For example, a male student may provide 
his test score while a female student doesn’t, however within each gender category, the 
probability of a missing test score was not associated with test score itself. Finally, for 
NMAR, “the possibility that a variable value is missing depends on the missing data 
values themselves” (Newman, 2009, p. 10). For example, overweight people might 
avoid providing their weight data due to medical or social consequences, in which case 
this type of missing data is non-ignorable. Figure 3.1 is a flow chart that helps identify 
types of missing data.  
 In this study, the call date is MAR, because it is related to an exogenous variable 
and is not associated with the variable itself. In other words, the probability of call date 
data being missing depended on the regional call Area Information Center (AIC). 
Furthermore, within the AIC, the probability of having a missing call date was not 







Figure 3.1. Determining the type of missing data 
  
Methods of Handling Missing Data 
 To improve the value of analysis, it is necessary to identify missing data by type 
and then to use appropriate methods for handling these data. Some studies have used 
benchmark datasets (e.g., different amounts of missing data or different missing data 
types) to compare alternative methods for handling missing data (Buhi, Goodson, & 
Neilands, 2008; Chen & Åstebro, 2003; Farhangfar, Kurgan, & Dy, 2008; Newman, 
2003; Scheffer, 2002; Sentas & Angelis, 2006). Others did not adequately consider 
missing data type or choose an appropriate method to manage missing data bias; whereas 




missing data in educational research, see Peugh & Enders, 2004; in psychology 
literature, see Roth, 1994).  
 
Table 3.1. Methods for handling the type of missing data 
 
Type of missing data Author Recommend methoda 
MCAR Roth (1994)b Pairwise deletion, Regression imputation, Hot-deck imputation 
 Allison (2001) ML, MI, Listwise deletion 
 Newman (2009) ML, MI 
MAR Roth (1994)b Hot-deck imputation, ML 
 Allison (2001) ML, MI 
 Scheffer (2002) MI works well. Single imputation methods work depending on the amount of missing. 
 Chen & Åstebro (2003) Listwise deletion is efficient; however if data loss is too much, Bayesian method is another solution.  
 Sentas & Angelis (2006) Multinomial logistic regression showed good performance for categorical missing data.  
 Buhi, Goodson, & Neilands (2008) 
Modern methods (ML, Bayesian estimation, MI) 
were better than ad hoc methods.  
 Newman (2003, 2009) ML, MI  
MNAR Roth (1994)b ML 
 Allison (2001) ML, MI (possible method “if the chosen model is correct”, see p.78)  
Note. aML = Maximum Likelihood; MI = Multiple Imputation. 
          bAmount of missing data is below 20 percent (see Roth 1994, p. 551).   
 
 Table 3.1 summarizes the recommended methods for handling missing data by 
type of missing data. The listwise deletion method has been widely used for MCAR and 
MAR types of missing data. Also, the hot-deck method is common in practice (Brown & 
Kros, 2003) and may be a viable alternative because the missing data are replaced using 
similar cases based on other variables related to respondents’ characteristics (Roth, 
1994). More recent studies, however, mostly agree that modern methods such as 




compared to ad hoc methods under MAR (Buhi, Goodson, & Neilands, 2008; Fox-
Wasylyshyn & El-Masri, 2005; Newman, 2003, 2009). Nevertheless, there is no single 
method that works for all types of missing data (Buhi, Goodson, & Neilands, 2008; 
Farhangfar, Kurgan, & Dy, 2008). Unfortunately, none of these methods were 
appropriate for the type of missingness encountered in our merged tertiary dataset. Thus, 
we needed an innovative approach to manage our missing data.  
 
Data Issues of Texas 2-1-1 Information & Referral  
 The datasets from the 25 Texas AICs used a variety of recording systems. Two-
thirds of the AICs had almost complete call records with both a dependent (housing-
related need) and two key independent variables (location and call date) per caller. 
Essentially, their data were MCAR. Of the remaining AIC datasets, some had both need 
and location variables, whereas others had only need data not associated with location 
and call date variables. In the caller needs housing-related dataset, approximately 32 
percent of call dates, a major variable of concern, were missing (Table 3.2).  
 
Table 3.2. Numbers and percentages of missing data for key variables in 2-1-1 caller  
needs dataset (total calls vs. housing-related calls), fall 2005 
 
Key variable 









Location 82,561 13.0 8,796 4.9 
Call date 212,551 33.0 58,213 32.2 





 The major source of missing call data was from the Dallas AIC call records. In 
the total dataset, Dallas data accounted for approximately 58.5 percent of call date 
missing overall and approximately 85 percent (N=49,614) of call date missing in the 
housing needs subset of data. Over 70 percent of 2-1-1 calls received by the Dallas AIC 
were from Dallas County that had about 10 percent of the Texas population in 2005. 
Hence, about 61 percent (N=35,638) of the housing-related dataset missing call dates 
came from Dallas County. Without Dallas County data from Dallas AIC, we would lose 
not only the disaster-related needs in this hurricane evacuation destination but also the 
routine needs of this major metropolitan area. Thus, a new method was needed to 




 The study population was Texas 2-1-1 Network caller data from August 1 
through December 31, 2005, for the 635,983 calls recorded from the 25 regional call 
centers. The data were in three forms: hand-written call logs, CDs of electronic data 
files, and summary reports from four call centers that had lost their raw data. After all 
caller identifiers were removed, the research team coded the data into a consistent 
database format and validated each step to minimize errors. Narrative descriptions of 
callers’ needs were categorized into types of basic disaster needs – housing, health, food, 





 This study focused on the subset of data for housing needs (N=180,601) with 
location and call date variables. The category of housing-related needs consisted of 
seven types: shelter, rental housing, ownership housing, mobile home, group home, 
public housing, and housing unknown. Caller location was coded as the county where 
the caller was looking for help (N=254 Texas counties or state outside of Texas). Call 
date was recoded into 17 disaster phases, beginning with a 4-week baseline before 
Katrina and extending 14 weeks following Rita (Table 3.3). 
 
Table 3.3. Study period of 2-1-1 tertiary data by disaster phase, fall 2005 
 
No. Disaster phases Date Number of days Duration 
1 Baseline 8/1–25 25 days 4 weeks before Katrina landfall 
2 Evacuation-K 8/26–28 3 days 1 to 3 days before Katrina landfall 
3 Landfall-K 8/29 1 day Katrina landfall 
4 Immediate 1 to 3 days-K 8/30–9/1 3 days 1 to 3 days after Katrina landfall  
5 Immediate 4 to 7 days-K 9/2–5 4 days 4 to 7 days after Katrina landfall 
6 Intermediate 2 weeks-K 9/6–12 7 days 2 weeks after Katrina landfall 
7 Intermediate 3 weeks-K 9/13–20a 8 days 3 weeks after Katrina landfall 
8 Evacuation-R 9/21–23 3 days 1 to 3 days before Rita landfall 
9 Landfall-R 9/24 1 day Rita Landfall  
10 Immediate 1 to 3 days-R 9/25–27 3 days 1 to 3 days after Rita landfall  
11 Immediate 4 to 7 days-R 9/28–10/1 4 days 4 to 7 days after Rita landfall 
12 Intermediate 2 weeks-R 10/2–8 7 days 2 weeks after Rita landfall  
13 Intermediate 3 weeks-R 10/9–15 7 days 3 weeks after Rita landfall 
14 Intermediate 4 weeks-R 10/16–22 7 days 4 weeks after Rita landfall 
15 Recovery 5 to 8 weeks-R 10/23–11/19 28 days 5-8 weeks after Rita landfall 
16 Recovery 9 to 12 weeks-R 11/20–12/17 28 days 9-12 weeks after Rita landfall 
17 Recovery 13 to 14 weeks-R 12/18–31 14 days 13-14 weeks after Rita landfall 
Note. aPhase has 8 days (7+1 extra day) because after that day, days overlap with Evacuation-R phase.  






Procedures to Impute Missing Data 
 This study examined the case when missing values could be imputed for a key 
categorical variable missing from one of multiple merged data sources so that a 
particular dataset could be salvaged to use in analysis and to reduce bias. In this study, 
the Dallas AIC had complete data for the dependent variable (housing-related needs) and 
one other independent variable (location) but was missing 100 percent of call date 
information. Without replacing missing date information in the sizable dataset from 
Dallas, analysis of housing needs over time would be limited and bias would be 
introduced about shelter needs known to be important in this major evacuation 
destination.  
 The two known variables (need and location) could be used to find values for the 
missing date variable (disaster phase) when compared to dataset(s) from a comparable 
type of location(s) for the same study period. Of the 25 call center locations, Harris 
County (Houston) and Bexar County (San Antonio) were selected given their 
comparable city size, evacuation destination role in the hurricane disasters, 2-1-1 call 
center size and volume of calls. Although neighboring Fort Worth may have been 
comparable to Dallas, their database was missing two of the three key variables so 
missing data could not be imputed. The remaining Texas metropolitan area, Travis 
County (Austin), was excluded because this call center provided support services for the 
Statewide 2-1-1 headquarters so its call patterns and types of needs differed considerably 
during these hurricane disasters. This decision-making process of finding comparable 







      Note.   X1 = Independent variable with missing categorical data = Disaster phase 
                  X2 = Other key independent variable(s) with known data = County location 
                    Y  = Dependent variable(s) = Housing unmet need 
 




 Figure 3.2 presents the decision process concerning how to most appropriately 
replace missing data for an independent categorical variable (X1: disaster phase). To 
begin, there must be sufficient complete data in the problem dataset for the dependent 
variable (Y: housing unmet need) and at least one other independent variable (X2: 







































The second step is to determine comparable datasets using equivalent: a) unit of 
analysis, b) study period, c) key variables (X2), and d) exogenous considerations that 
logically would link the data sources. In this case, the exogenous considerations were 
comparable city size, major evacuation role in disaster, and 2-1-1 call center size for 
managing call data collection and recording.  
 
 
Note. K = Katrina; R = Rita. 
Figure 3.3. Percentages of calls for housing unmet needs by disaster phase for Harris,  













Table 3.4. Imputing Dallas 2-1-1 calls by disaster phase for housing unmet needs based 




1 calls for housing 
needs by disaster 
phase 
Bexar County: 2-1-1 
calls for housing 
needs by disaster 
phase 
Averaged 











N % N % % N 
Baseline 5,945 19.7 1,743 18.7 19.2 6,834 
Evacuation-K 316 1.0 79 0.8 0.9 337 
Landfall-K 349 1.2 120 1.3 1.2 435 
Immediate 1 to 3 days-K 935 3.1 272 2.9 3.0 1,071 
Immediate 4 to 7 days-K 476 1.6 47 0.5 1.0 371 
Intermediate 2 weeks-K 1,514 5.0 511 5.5 5.2 1,868 
Intermediate 3 weeks-K 1,811 6.0 424 4.5 5.3 1,878 
Evacuation-R 378 1.3 440 4.7 3.0 1,063 
Landfall-R 6 0.0 12 0.1 0.1 26 
Immediate 1 to 3 days-R 360 1.2 192 2.1 1.6 579 
Immediate 4 to 7 days-R 584 1.9 177 1.9 1.9 682 
Intermediate 2 weeks-R 1,233 4.1 295 3.2 3.6 1,290 
Intermediate 3 weeks-R 1,884 6.2 455 4.9 5.6 1,980 
Intermediate 4 weeks-R 1,226 4.1 511 5.5 4.8 1,698 
Recovery 5 to 8 weeks-R 6,504 21.5 2,030 21.7 21.6 7,711 
Recovery 9 to 12 weeks-R 4,855 16.1 1,530 16.4 16.2 5,784 
Recovery 13 to 14 weeks-R 1,818 6.0 502 5.4 5.7 2,031 
Total 30,194 100.0 9,340 100.0 100.0 35,638 
Note. K = Katrina; R = Rita. 
 
  
 The third step is to use the comparable datasets to calculate proportion of cases 
for Y (housing unmet need) per X1 strata (disaster phase). These proportions per X1 
strata should be compared across the variety of comparable datasets to identify 
consistency. Differences in proportions per strata should then be tested statistically for 




would be more confidence in imputing these proportions for missing values (see Table 
3.4 for application example). If a specific strata differs significantly between comparable 
datasets but other strata are consistent, then an average of the strata proportions among 
the comparable datasets is used. If multiple X1 strata vary significantly between the 
comparable datasets, then the researcher would need to justify the logic of narrowing the 
selection of a comparable dataset(s). Again, limitations underlying the selection of fewer 
comparable datasets would need to be noted, much like the rejection of Ft. Worth’s and 
Austin’s datasets discussed previously.    
 To progress to the fourth step, differences in proportion of housing needs per 
disaster phase between two comparable datasets (Harris and Bexar Counties) are 
visualized in Figure 3.3. Both Harris County (Houston) and Bexar County (San Antonio) 
were comparable matches, except in two phases immediately before and after Hurricane 
Rita. Houstonians and Katrina victims had evacuated before Hurricane Rita veered 
northward for landfall; then they sought shelter, food and fuel before returning to 
Houston. Thus, based on Figure 3.3, it was decided that averaged proportions of these 
two counties were appropriate for allocating the number of calls in each disaster phase 
for Dallas County data (shown by the black bar).  
 The fourth step is to calculate the proportion of cases in each X1 strata used to 
replace the missing values. There are two strategies for doing this. The first would be to 
add the number of cases within a strata across the comparable datasets, then calculate a 
proportion of that strata per total cases among the comparable datasets. This approach 




equivalent number of cases within each strata per dataset. A second approach would be 
to use an average of the proportions of the comparable datasets for each X1 strata. This 
would “even out” minor variations between the strata proportions in each dataset and not 
have the subtle bias of one dataset being much larger than the other, thus possibly 
weighting the total proportion in a biased way.   
 In the fifth and last step, the proportion of cases per X1 strata calculated from the 
comparable databases is then used to impute the missing data per strata (see study 
example in Table 3.4). The number of cases for each X1 strata for the missing variable 
dataset is calculated using the proportions by each X1 strata (i.e., disaster phase) 
multiplied by total number of cases in that dataset with the missing variable.  
 For example:  
Baseline phase in Dallas County =  
 [19.7% (from Harris County) + 18.7% (from Bexar County)]/2 = 
19.2 % average proportion of calls for housing unmet needs.  
   Multiplied by: Total number of calls for housing unmet needs for 
Dallas County from Dallas 2-1-1 call center = 35,638  
Thus: 19.2% × 35,638 = 6,834 for the baseline phase of Dallas County  
This process is repeated for each X1 strata to impute missing disaster 
phase data for Dallas County.  
 There are two strategies for assigning cases into each strata: 1) random selection 
without replacement and 2) systematic selection (choose every Nth) with a random start. 




random selection is preferred. In this study, random selection without replacement 
method was used. First, the strata order of disaster phases were randomized according to 
which strata of cases would be selected 1st, 2nd, ith. Then, using a random number 
generator, the cases were selected per strata, being sure to go through the complete list of 
cases at least once. Although this method could introduce error, at least it would be 
randomized. For example, housing needs related to disaster sheltering could be assigned 
randomly to the pre-hurricane baseline phase. One would then need to review known 
key indicators in the dependent variable of housing needs (e.g., disaster sheltering, 
FEMA financing for repairs, “blue roof”) for inappropriate placement into X1 strata to 
determine error frequency in the random assignment. 
 
Effect of the Model to Impute Missing Data 
 Replacing missing Dallas County data by disaster phase significantly increased 
the number of cases (N=35,638) available for analysis of disaster unmet housing needs 
over time. In Figure 3.4, the original number of calls for housing unmet needs by 
disaster phase (gray) is compared to imputed Dallas data (black). As expected, the 
overall call pattern after replacing the lost Dallas County data (gray + black) was similar 
to the pattern shown before data replacement (gray). However, to understand state-level 
unmet housing needs during a disaster, it would be important for emergency managers 
and policymakers to know the more accurate volume of demand by disaster phase. The 
size of this demand would be significantly miscalculated without imputing missing 




determine which disaster phases had high demand for housing unmet needs, but also to 
quantify those housing needs in order to more effectively and efficiently deliver 
emergency relief services. 
 
 
Note. K = Katrina; R = Rita. 
Figure 3.4. Numbers of state level calls for housing unmet needs by disaster phase in 




 This data has several limitations. First, biases from other missing data were 
unknown. Calls were dropped during peak call volume. Surge of calls during landfall 
were not logged as staff and volunteers were too overwhelmed with call demand to enter 













capacity. Although it seemed that only 0.4 percent of calls without need data (N= 2,799) 
were missing randomly, the information of these cases were excluded in this analysis of 
housing needs. Although call volume and needs would be underestimated, 2-1-1 staff 
reported that the types of needs were not expected to differ.  
 Potential socio-economic biases of the 2-1-1 caller population may be expected 
to bias the types of needs reported, but there were no demographic data available to test 
this. Also unknown was whether callers were local residents seeking help for routine 
needs or evacuees needing disaster assistance. These caller characteristics may also 
influence timing of when they needed help during the disaster phases. This dataset of all 
2-1-1 calls statewide during the 5-month study period captured variation in type and 
volume of housing unmet needs. As every disaster is unique, generalizations would be 
recommendations for further policies to improve disaster response and recovery. 
Nevertheless, the strength of these recommendations is improved greatly by replacing 
35,638 cases with missing data of housing and shelter needs in a major metropolitan 
evacuation destination. 
 Second, there were further limitations of this model to impute missing data. It 
could be applied to MAR type of missing data, but not for MNAR. However, the 
distinction of MAR versus MNAR may not be possible in many cases “because the 
values of the missing data are not available for comparison” (Newman, 2003, p. 358). 
For example, in this study, the probability of missing call date information depended on 
AICs where the data was collected, and within the AICs, the probability of having 




type of missing data. Therefore, researchers would need to classify the type of missing 
data for their dataset before using this method.  
 Third, if a dataset has many key variables and part of the dataset has one missing 
variable, researchers may prefer other methods. For example, if this dataset had socio-
economic characteristics of the 2-1-1 callers, hot-deck or multiple imputation method 
could be considered. However, the dataset did not have the additional information, so 
that this new method was needed. Thus, if the dataset has only a few key variables and 
part of the data has one missing variable (i.e., the datasets did not have enough 
predictors for the missing variable), then researchers can consider this method for 
salvaging tertiary data sources.  
 Finally, this missing variable (call date) was originally an interval variable (153 
days); however, it was recoded and replaced as a categorical variable (17 disaster 
phases) because it could be more robust for future analysis. Thus, when researchers want 
to use this method, they may consider changing the type of their variable from interval to 
categorical.  
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 Tertiary data have the advantage of saving considerable time and effort to collect 
a large dataset. Yet, researchers could be faced with difficulties to aggregate tertiary data 
from disparate sources. This is particularly problematic if one subset of data has 
systematically missing data in a key variable that may bias the findings. Ideally, one 




In reality, programs and agencies collecting large datasets have evolved their own 
preferences for collecting and coding their data (e.g., Census, NOAA, EPA, FEMA, Red 
Cross, CDC, 9-1-1). These differences become obvious when trying to merge datasets 
for more comprehensive understanding of trends over time and location. Although many 
authors have addressed a variety of missing data issues for primary datasets, no studies 
were found that examined this problem in merging tertiary datasets. The ability to 
salvage an important dataset enables researchers to explore a broader variety of tertiary 
data for more valid meta-analyses.  
 In this study, we developed a model to impute missing data for a key variable 
(disaster phase) in order to merge 25 different tertiary 2-1-1 datasets to analyze disaster 
unmet housing needs before, during and after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita throughout 
Texas. The approach developed a systematic algorithm within parameters of the nature 
of the missing data (random vs. systematic) and the logical sources of comparative data 
(e.g., collected from similar city or organizational size, disaster experience(s), socio-
demographic characteristics). By applying this method, the amount of data available for 
analysis increased about 30 percent, thus significantly improving the validity of the 
findings. 
 A next step would be to replicate this method in a simulated dataset where the 
reliability and validity could be measured and tested. Errors were known to occur, for 
example assigning a case with unmet shelter or “blue roof” needs occurring prior to the 
hurricanes. Besides examining known disaster housing types of needs assigned to non-




could not be determined. Further refinement of this model could include adjusting 
replacement of missing data according to socio-demographic groups, e.g., replacement 
within matching gender, race/ethnicity, age groups. This refinement could not be used in 
this study of 2-1-1 data as demographic variables were not consistently nor reliably 
collected.  
 With growing research interest in employing tertiary data for studies, appropriate 
handling of missing data needs to be developed to merge these tertiary datasets. In this 
perspective, the method discussed in this study will contribute to better managing 
missing data in a key variable from tertiary datasets, and to improving statistical validity. 
Moreover, the practitioner who is dealing with a broader availability of tertiary data 
would benefit to investigate a more complete set of data collected from the growing 





CHAPTER IV  
SHELTERING, RENTAL AND OWNERSHIP HOUSING UNMET NEEDS DURING 
HURRICANES KATRINA AND RITA IN TEXAS, 2005 
 
Introduction 
 In 2005, the U.S. experienced fifteen hurricanes, making it one of the worst years 
in terms of natural disasters (NOAA, 2006). In late August, over a million people were 
moved from their homes because of Hurricane Katrina (Godoy, 2006). A month later, 
Hurricane Rita leveled homes in east Texas near the Louisiana border. The fresh 
memory of Katrina’s devastation and mismanagement prompted mass evacuations along 
the Texas coast of an estimated 3.7 million people seeing shelter inland (Eskovitz, 
2006). In the aftermath of these sequential disasters, recovery efforts to meet Katrina 
victims’ needs for temporary housing were significantly compounded by housing needs 
of Rita victims as well.    
 Several studies have focused on sheltering and housing recovery after these 
hurricane disasters. However, few have examined the variation of housing issues over 
time, including before and during disasters and into the recovery phase. None have 
tracked unmet needs for disaster housing throughout disaster phases. Furthermore, 
shortcomings of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Red Cross, and the 
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) data present problems to 
accurately estimate variation in numbers, locations, and types of housing needs of 




difficult to understand timing and duration of specific housing needs and to prepare 
adequate disaster related policies, plans and programs. In the past, disaster planners and 
managers may have relied on assumptions that displaced people could go back to their 
original places (Lubell, 2005). Following experiences from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, 
these assumptions have changed. 
 The purpose of this study was to identify and quantify unmet housing needs 
before, during, and after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita by housing type using Texas’ 2-1-1 
Information and Referral (I&R) caller data. Unmet housing needs were identified based 
on callers’ requests for 2-1-1 that revealed access barriers using real-time data. 
Therefore, unmet housing needs arose when people were not able to meet housing needs 
with their own financial or information resources. It is important that planners and 
managers understand what unmet housing needs may exist during disasters, to then 
prepare adequate programs for accessible disaster management and relief. In this study, 
unmet housing needs were examined over time, ranging from a baseline of a month 
before Hurricane Katrina throughout three months following Hurricane Rita. 
Additionally, these housing needs were categorized by specific housing types: shelter, 
rental housing (including public housing), and ownership housing. The 2-1-1 data 
covered all 254 counties in Texas and included housing needs not only of disaster 
victims, but also from communities that hosted those evacuees along with routine needs 







Housing Needs during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita  
 On August 29, 2005, Katrina made landfall in southeast Louisiana as a Category 
3 hurricane (Knabb, Rhome, & Brown, 2005). One day before landfall, mandatory 
evacuation was ordered in New Orleans (DeLozier & Kamp, 2005); however, many 
remained by choice or had been stranded. Two days after landfall on August 31st, 
Louisiana Governor Blanco ordered total evacuation of New Orleans (DeLozier & 
Kamp, 2005). Hurricane Katrina caused about 1,833 deaths (Lott, Ross, Smith, Houston, 
& Shein, 2011) and damaged about 228,000 occupied housing units (Muro, Liu, Sohmer, 
Warren, & Park, 2005). The estimated damage from Hurricane Katrina was roughly 
$125 billion, the costliest natural disaster in the U.S. at that time (Lott, Ross, Smith, 
Houston, & Shein, 2011). Of more than one million Katrina evacuees sheltered 
throughout the nation, over 400,000 evacuees went to Texas (Community Affairs 
Department, 2006).  
 Just a few weeks after Hurricane Katrina’s landfall, another category 3 hurricane 
came on September 24th. Hurricane Rita made landfall near the Texas and Louisiana 
border at Sabine Pass, Texas, and Johnson’s Bayou, Louisiana (Knabb, Brown, & 
Rhome, 2006). Unlike the disastrous experiences with evacuation from Hurricane 
Katrina, Texas started Rita evacuation three days prior to landfall (Crawford & 
Company, 2005). With shelter needs already overburdened by Katrina evacuees, 
Hurricane Rita created more than three million displaced people and damaged or 




Information Service, 2007). Evacuees were reported in all 254 Texas counties, with 
exceptional housing and shelter demand throughout the state.  
 In 2006, hurricane victims in Texas were still housed in 3,403 travel trailers as 
temporary housing (FEMA, 2006a). By February 2006, FEMA had received 640,968 
Individual Assistance applicants in Texas resulting from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 
(FEMA, 2006b). FEMA continued to provide rental assistance to about 107,000 
households in Texas as of August 2006 (FEMA, 2006c). Federal assistance in response 
to the 2005 Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma amounted to $109 billion; with about 
half ($52 billion) allocated to temporary and long-term housing, e.g., flood insurance 
program, Community Development Block Grant (CDBG), temporary manufactured 
housing or temporary home repair (Fellowes & Liu, 2006). 
 
Phases of Disaster Sheltering and Housing  
 Disaster phasing has been useful in coordinating disaster management activities 
and determining the scope of disaster research (Neal, 1997). Quarantelli (1982, 1995) 
defined four phases of disaster-related sheltering and housing: emergency sheltering, 
temporary sheltering, temporary housing, and permanent housing. In Quarantelli’s first 
stage, disaster related emergency sheltering, “actual or potential disaster victims” 
(Quarantelli, 1995, p. 45) use schools, churches, or stadium arenas as emergency 
sheltering for a few hours or overnight (Quarantelli, 1995). During the second phase, 
temporary shelters are related to short-term displacement in friends/relative’s house, 




shelters are distinguished in terms of “behavioral aspects” (Quarantelli, 1995, p. 45) 
related to food, clothing, or sleeping areas (Phillips, 2009). People with different 
socioeconomic status would seek different types of emergency or temporary shelter. 
When possible, evacuees would choose to stay at a friend’s house or hotel instead of 
public shelter (Tierney, Lindell, & Perry, 2001). Those with affordability or availability 
barriers would be more likely to use mass shelters (Mileti, Sorensen, & O’Brien, 1992; 
Yelvington, 1997). Although many communities had the capacity to shelter and house 
evacuees, these sequential disasters required state and federal involvement to meet 
urgent sheltering needs for hundreds of thousands of evacuees displaced for weeks or 
even permanently (FEMA, 2009). 
 When the need for temporary shelter lasts more than a few days, people would be 
expected to seek interim housings or temporary housings such as rental units, or mobile 
homes (Quarantelli, 1982, 1995). In this third phase, evacuees needed alternative 
housing to reestablish a normal routine (cooking, sleeping, shopping, social activities, 
job, and school) until they would be able to acquire permanent housing (Quarantelli, 
1982, 1995; Phillips, 2009). To utilize various temporary housing options, evacuees may 
need rental assistance. To qualify for disaster rental assistance, the rental property must 
be financially and physically appropriate and available (FEMA, 2009). If the supply of 
temporary housing did not meet community needs or was prohibitively expensive, 
individuals and families would be forced to relocate yet again to another neighborhood 
or community. Factory-built manufactured homes (e.g., mobile homes) and recreational 




(FEMA, 2009). Higher-income households usually preferred to supplement rental 
assistance to help pay for more traditional housing rather than use mobile homes 
(Quarantelli, 1982).  
 In the last phase, providing permanent housing, a disaster victim’s original home 
would be repaired or rebuilt; otherwise new housing would be obtainable (Quarantelli, 
1995). Some Katrina evacuees who had lost their homes chose to make their temporary 
housing permanent. During this phase, single-family homeowners were more likely to 
take advantage of government assistance programs than were owners of multi-family 
housing units (Comerio, 1997). Additionally, single-family homes were faster to recover 
than other types of dwellings in duplexes or apartment buildings (Lu, 2008). 
 Mitchell, Esnard, and Sapat (2012) summarized overall institutional timelines of 
sheltering and housing from their case study of Hurricanes Andrew, Katrina, and Ike. 
They pointed out that the time frame for providing emergency shelter by the American 
Red Cross was up to two weeks; temporary shelter was covered by FEMA up to three 
months, possibly extending up to 18 months; and FEMA provided for temporary housing 
up to 18 months. However, in the case of Hurricane Katrina, many displaced people 
stayed in emergency shelters up to seven weeks, and then moved to temporary shelter 
from three months up to two years (Mitchell, Esnard, & Sapat, 2012). Three months 
after Hurricane Katrina, FEMA started providing trailers and mobile homes to the 
victims as temporary housing (Mitchell, Esnard, & Sapat, 2012). It took six years until 
the last trailer left (Muskal, 2012). The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 




years later HUD created the Disaster Housing Assistance Program (DHAP-Katrina) that 
provided assistance to over 30,000 families (U.S. Senate 2009). 
 Although disaster phases are useful empirical tools for organizing disaster 
management, there are limitations resulting from an “overlap of phases” as noted by 
Haas, Kates, and Bowden (1977) and Quarantelli (1982, p. 280). Each phase is not 
expected to be mutually exclusive (Neal, 1997). Disaster managers may simultaneously 
provide sheltering needs as well as housing recovery needs (Quarantelli, 1995). This 
situation was unusually complex in the case of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita with the two 
disasters occurring so close in time and location, compounding housing and sheltering 
needs in both disaster sites as well as evacuation destinations.   
 
 The 2-1-1 Information and Referral (I&R) Service During Disasters 
 During disasters (e.g., hurricanes, flooding, wildfires, winter storms, H1N1), 2-1-
1 has played an important role nationwide. In 2000, the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) approved the 3-digit number 2-1-1 for Information and Referral 
(I&R) telephone support regarding non-emergency services, similar to 9-1-1 for 
emergencies. In 2004, Texas completed its statewide 2-1-1 system network comprised of 
twenty-five autonomous regional call centers. Immediately following Hurricane Katrina 
evacuation in August 2005, this system was designated by the Texas Governor’s Office 
of Emergency Management as a communication hub between disaster and community 
support services and callers with non-emergency needs. During and after Hurricanes 




communication system to connect callers seeking help with available resources and 
services (United Way of America, n.d.). Hence, the Texas 2-1-1 Network was ready to 
provide statewide disaster coverage “24/7” to Katrina-Rita evacuees as well as 
communities hosting these evacuees throughout the state. 
 
Methods  
Study Population and Data Collection  
 The study population included all 2-1-1 calls from August 1 through December 
31, 2005 (N=635,983 total calls), logged in “real time” by the twenty-five Area 
Information Centers (AICs) in Texas. Certified 2-1-1 staff recorded each call into a 2-1-
1 database to match needs to appropriate information and/or available referral programs. 
During emergency phases of both Katrina and Rita, trained volunteers logged their calls 
into supplemental call records either on paper or electronically. Typically each AIC 
would handle calls from counties within their regional jurisdiction. During disasters, the 
2-1-1 Texas I&R Network (TIRN) implemented its capability to have AICs function as a 
single I&R system sharing local resource databases statewide to serve caller demand 
with the next available staff regardless of location. Hence, if one AIC lost phone or 
power or had to evacuate, the other AICs would seamlessly manage all calls. Also, larger 
urban AICs could support smaller call centers to cope with call surges while providing 
rapidly updated disaster resource information. Because of this rollover capability, it was 
important to merge and analyze the twenty-five Texas AIC databases to determine needs 




reported evacuees from one or both storms, again highlighting the importance of a 
statewide analysis for all Texas 2-1-1 calls.          
 The five-month study period encompassed a four-week baseline prior to 
Hurricane Katrina through three months of recovery after Hurricane Rita landfall. In 
winter of 2006, the 2-1-1 call data from the study period were collected from each AIC 
and stored at TIRN headquarters. Upon project funding in 2008 by the Department of 
Homeland Security, any identifying information was deleted from the AIC datasets then 
released to the researchers. The data were coded from the original electronic and paper 
data sources into a uniform file format, validated at 100%, then merged. 
 
Study Variables  
Three variables were consistently collected throughout the 2-1-1 dataset: 1) call 
date, 2) caller’s location by county, and 3) description of caller’s unmet need(s). Call 
date was logged by 2-1-1 staff and volunteers for AICs recording on paper forms or 
notes, particularly prevalent during the surge of calls during evacuation and the 
emergency period following landfall. Electronic call data had an automatic default to 
document call date. Call dates were then aggregated into six disaster phases (Table 4.1). 
There was a four-week baseline phase prior to Hurricane Katrina. Next, an emergency 
phase for each hurricane included landfall and the subsequent week where acute and 
urgent needs would be addressed. Three-day evacuation prior to Rita was included in 
this emergency phase as well. An intermediate phase was set to include 3 weeks post 




took care of crises so they could begin to resume work, school, and community 
activities. Katrina’s intermediate phase was cut short by the arrival of Hurricane Rita. 
The ten-week recovery phase in this study began after one month post-Rita landfall until 
the end of the calendar year. Recovery needs of both Katrina and Rita victims would be 
reflected during this phase.  
 
Table 4.1. Study period of Texas 2-1-1 data by disaster phase, fall 2005 
 
No. Disaster phase Date Number of days Duration 
1 Baseline (Base) 8/1–28 28 days 4 weeks before Katrina landfall 
2 Emergency-Katrina (E-K) 8/29–9/4 7 days 1 week after Katrina landfall 
3 Intermediate-Katrina (I-K) 9/5-20 16 days 2 to 3 weeks after Katrina landfall 
4 Emergency-Rita (E-R) 9/21-30 10 days 3 days before and 1 week after Rita landfall  
5 Intermediate-Rita (I-R) 10/1-21 21 days 2 to 4 weeks after Rita landfall 
6 Recovery  10/22–12/31 71 days 5 to 14 weeks after Rita landfall 
Note. * Emergency-Rita phase includes 3 days evacuation before the landfall.  
 
 Location was recorded by the AICs as city, zip code, and/or county of the caller 
and of the recommended agency(s) or program(s) where the caller was seeking help. The 
researchers recoded location as the destination where the caller sought help for housing 
or shelter needs, i.e., the location of the referral organization, program, or service. 
Location data were aggregated to the county level (N=254 Texas counties) to preserve 
anonymity as well as enable comparisons to census measures of population size to 




 In this study, unmet needs relating to housing and shelter were used for analysis 
(N=180,601). Within the set of housing-related unmet needs, seven kinds of housing 
needs were empirically identified from the raw data: shelter (N=20,007), rental housing 
(N=35,267), ownership housing (N=6,542), mobile home (N=36), group home 
(N=1,324), public housing (N=4,021), and housing need with no further information 
about type (N=113,884). Note that shelter needs were not always mutually exclusive 
from other housing types as well as financial aid for rent and mortgage were coded 
together. Because of the small number of cases of group homes and mobile homes, these 
types were deleted from the longitudinal analysis as well as excluding calls where 
specific types of housing were not identified. Needs related to public housing were 
incorporated into the rental category.  
 
Data Analysis  
Analysis of 2-1-1 caller unmet needs was conducted for each of the three major 
housing types: shelter, rental housing, and ownership housing. First, a qualitative 
description was presented of the most frequent types of unmet needs within each housing 
type. Second, the volume of unmet needs was graphed for the number of calls daily per 
housing type over the five-month study period, illustrating variation in the pattern of 
unmet needs within and between the different disaster phases. The high volume of unmet 
needs showed that there was a lack of access to resources. Last, the weekly total number 
of unmet needs by housing type was overlaid on a single graph to show the differences 




Limitations of the Data 
 It should be noted that the number of 2-1-1 callers were expected to be 
underestimated. During disaster call surges, 2-1-1 staff and volunteers could not keep up 
with documenting each call as well as calls were disconnected from the automated phone 
system or dropped if callers did not hold until 2-1-1 personnel were able to answer. 
However, it would not be expected that the nature of caller needs not documented would 
be different than calls recorded during these peak times. Data missing specific type of 
housing need would also contribute to underestimating the volume of demand by 
housing type, but again, were not expected to differ from the overall trends found in the 
detailed data according to 2-1-1 staff recollections of their data collection during the 
disasters. 
 Representativeness of 2-1-1 callers compared to other evacuees or community 
residents was unknown as demographic data were not reliably collected. The 2-1-1 
callers were motivated to seek help to overcome access barriers to meet their non-
emergency needs. Callers may have been familiar with this service through prior 
experience encountering access barriers to community support services, via 
recommendations of community programs or family/friends, and from Texas disaster 
management’s promotion of 2-1-1 as a gateway to community disaster support services. 
But comparisons to other disaster victims, service or program users, or county 
demographics would be inappropriate. Hence, this remains a case study of Texas 2-1-1 
callers throughout disaster phases of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Nevertheless, the 




extended time span through all disaster phases provides a unique portrayal of a 
vulnerable population’s housing needs during disaster and recovery.  
 
Results 
Volume of Unmet Needs by Housing Type 
 A total of 635,983 Texas 2-1-1 calls were logged during the five-month study 
period encompassing four weeks baseline prior to Hurricane Katrina through three 
months of recovery following Hurricane Rita. Calls related to housing and shelter needs 
totaled N=180,601 during this period. The proportion of housing-related unmet needs 
was the highest (28%) compared to calls for other basic disaster unmet needs for food 
(15%), medical (18%), and transportation (4%). Sixty-three percent (N=113,884) of the 
housing-related needs did not have a housing type identified. Of the remainder 
(N=66,717), five housing types were empirically determined—unmet housing needs 
regarding: rental housing, shelter, owner housing, group homes, and mobile homes 
(Figure 4.1). Another type, public housing (N=4,021), was aggregated with rental 
housing (N=35,267) as the specific nature of their unmet needs were similar. The 
number of unmet needs by housing type did not sum to the total because 2-1-1 data entry 
included shelter needs recorded along with other housing types as well as overlapping 






Note. *Excluding number of calls without specific housing type information (N=113,884). 
        ** Housing types were not mutually exclusive; total = 66,717. 
 
Figure 4.1. Volume of unmet housing needs by housing type, fall 2005 
 
 
 The volume of rental housing unmet needs, including public housing, was 22% 
of all housing needs and was the largest group (59%) among the housing types 
documented. Shelter-related unmet needs were almost half of the volume of rental 
housing related needs, making up 11% of all housing needs and 30% of the housing 
types. Ownership housing needs were approximately a third of shelter-related needs; 
comprising 4% of all housing-related needs and 10% of housing types. Unmet needs 
regarding group and mobile homes were unexpectedly small; both less than 1% of 
overall housing-related needs. Unmet needs related to group living comprised 2% of 
housing types and mobile homes at 0.05%. Because of the small number of calls for 
























Qualitative Analysis of Unmet Needs by Housing Type 
 The 2-1-1 call centers documented caller needs using the nationwide 2-1-1 
taxonomy; however, the degree of specificity varied by call center as well as by when 
the call was received according to demands of call surge or staffing per shift. The 
researchers aggregated needs to adjust for redundancies inherent within the taxonomy. 
Further adjustments were made for volunteers’ narrative coding to group similar terms 
with those of the need taxonomy. For example, “Homeless Shelter” included homeless 
drop-in centers, shelter-homeless, homeless help, shelter for homeless. In Tables 4.2–
4.4, specific needs encountered during the study period were itemized by housing type.  
 The majority (59%) of unmet housing needs concerned rental issues (Table 4.2). 
Over three-quarters (78%) of the unmet rental housing needs were problems accessing 
financial assistance for rent and/or deposit. Another 11% were also financially-related 
problems for help to access public housing, low income or subsidized housing, and 
Section 8 housing. Almost 5% of callers sought help with housing authorities and 
another 2% needed help handling landlord/tenant issues. It was likely that evacuees and 
community residents had direct access to other housing, real estate, and community 
social service resources to help locate housing for specific needs. Less than 1% of callers 
with rental needs sought access to housing for special needs such as disabled, elderly, 
and assisted living. Another 0.6% needed help to find available rental housing, boarding 
houses, or single room occupancy. Only 0.3% of rental calls were documented as 
disaster-related as the 2-1-1 taxonomy did not differentiate disaster-related from routine 




Table 4.2. Specific unmet rental housing needs in Texas, fall 2005 
 
Unmet rental housing needs Frequency Percent of unmet rental housing needs 
Rent/rental deposit assistance  30,557  77.8% 
Public housing  2,119  5.4% 
Housing authorities  1,845  4.7% 
Low income/subsidized rental housing  1,707  4.3% 
Landlord/tenant  796  2.0% 
Section 8  596  1.5% 
Assisted living facilities  224  0.6% 
Rental housing/apartment  117 0.3% 
Disaster specific rent assistance 111 0.3% 
Rooming/boarding houses  81  0.2% 
Single room occupancy housing  56  0.1% 
Elderly/disabled home rental listings  5  0.01% 
Other (If number of specific need < 2)  1,074  2.7% 
Total  39,288  100.0% 
 
 
 Unmet shelter needs were 30% of 2-1-1 housing-related calls by type (Table 4.3). 
Disaster shelters comprised almost half (47%) of the specific needs for those looking for 
access to transitional shelter, mass shelter care, disaster shelter, emergency shelter, post-
disaster housing, and shelter from bad weather. Only an additional 1.4% of shelter-
related calls were for information on hotels, motels and vouchers for these that were 
supplementing shelter beds in evacuation destinations. It was assumed that 6% of calls 
were non-disaster related for access to community special needs shelters such as 
domestic violence, family crisis, runaway, and women’s shelters. Forty percent of 
shelter-related requests were undifferentiated and simply coded as shelter or homeless 




of unmet shelter needs was for access to disaster shelters, along with general sheltering 
help.  
 
Table 4.3. Specific unmet shelter needs in Texas, fall 2005 
 
Unmet shelter needs Frequency Percent of unmet shelter needs 
Homeless shelter  4,137  20.7% 
Shelter  3,152  15.8% 
Transitional shelter  2,544  12.7% 
Mass shelter care  2,502  12.5% 
Disaster shelter  2,481  12.4% 
Emergency shelter  1,216  6.1% 
Domestic violence shelter  822  4.1% 
Community shelter  646  3.2% 
Post disaster housing  494  2.5% 
Family crisis shelters  309  1.5% 
Hotels/motels  156  0.8% 
Homeless motel vouchers  118  0.6% 
Bad weather shelters  71  0.4% 
Runaway shelter  70  0.3% 
Women’s shelter  53  0.3% 
Other (If number of specific need < 2)  1,236  6.2% 
Total  20,007  100.0% 
 
 
 Unmet needs for those who owned their own home were approximately 10% of 
the housing types analyzed (Table 4.4). This lower percentage of unmet needs did not 
compare to ownership rate (65.9% from U.S. Census Bureau 2005) in Texas 
communities; hence it was speculated that there were many fewer access barriers to 




Table 4.4. Specific unmet ownership housing needs in Texas, fall 2005 
 
Unmet ownership housing needs Frequency 
Percent of unmet 
ownership housing 
needs 
Mortgage assistance 2,688 41.1% 
Home rehabilitation/repair services 2,625 40.1% 
Home rehabilitation/repair grants/loans 180 2.8% 
Heat the Town 161 2.5% 
Housing down payment/purchase loans 121 1.8% 
Homeowner/home purchase counseling 108 1.7% 
Home modifications 78 1.2% 
Ramp construction 62 0.9% 
Disaster specific home repairs 55 0.8% 
Plumbing repair 55 0.8% 
Roof repair 41 0.6% 
Sweat equity programs 34 0.5% 
Weatherization 24 0.4% 
Other (If number of specific need < 2) 310 4.7% 
Total  6,542  100.0% 
 
 
Almost half (47%) of homeowner unmet needs related to access for financial 
assistance, namely, mortgage assistance, home rehabilitation/repair grants or loans, and 
down payment or purchase loans. An equivalent amount (47%) was for help meeting 
home repair or rehabilitation needs, including services and grants or loans for repair, as 
well as home modifications, ramp construction, plumbing and roof repair. Less than 1% 
of 2-1-1 calls for home ownership type were recorded as disaster specific repairs, again 
underestimating these types of needs due to limitations of the 2-1-1 software constraints 
for differentiating disaster-related needs. Heat the Town was a program in some Texas 
communities in late fall of 2005 to help with utility bills and installations for home 




weatherization. This type of need may be classified with financial aspects, repair, and 
disaster-related help for homeowners. 
 
Longitudinal Patterns of Unmet Housing Needs by Housing Type 
 Longitudinal patterns of unmet needs by housing type were measured as the 
distribution of 2-1-1 calls per day per housing type plotted over the five-month study 
period (Figures 4.2–4.4). Patterns of 2-1-1 call volume for unmet housing needs had 
weekly cycles, typically with a peak in call volume at the beginning of the week then 
tapering off to a considerable drop over the weekend despite 24/7 availability of 2-1-1 
services. It was speculated by 2-1-1’s leadership that this low level of weekend use 
reflected callers demand during operating hours of social service agencies, with higher 
use early in the week from pent-up demand for unmet needs over the weekend. This 
overall weekly pattern differed during evacuation and disaster response phases, then 
resumed during recovery except during Thanksgiving and Christmas holidays.   
 The longitudinal pattern of unmet rental housing needs was slightly higher at the 
beginning of each month and followed the typical weekly cycle except during 
emergency response phase immediately after landfall (E-K, E-R) and during the holidays 
(Figure 4.2). There were higher levels of unmet rental housing needs during intermediate 
disaster response phases (I-K, I-R), otherwise the pattern for rental-related needs were 
consistent during the five-month study period, reaching up to 325 to 358 calls per day 
during the weeks prior to Hurricane Katrina and during recovery. There was a 




then a sudden increase the following week. Further increases followed in the subsequent 
few weeks during the intermediate disaster response phase for both Hurricanes. Unmet 
rental housing needs were highest in the intermediate response phase after Katrina, 
spiking to 462 calls per day for help with rental housing-related needs. Perhaps disaster 
victims were seeking rental assistance to meet temporary housing needs. This phase also 
included unmet public housing needs that surged between Katrina and Rita, likely given 
that many Katrina evacuees were unable to promptly qualify for Texas public housing. 
The weekly cycle also varied during the recovery phase in preparation for the holidays 
as well as seeking help for rental assistance as the weather turned colder.   
 
 





The overall pattern of 2-1-1 calls for shelter-related unmet needs was a clear 
portrait of demand during emergency response post-landfall (E-K, E-R) (Figure 4.3). 
Before Hurricane Katrina, there were about 60 shelter related calls per day throughout 
the state. The volume of calls first peaked a few days after Katrina made landfall when 
Katrina evacuees were sent to Texas shelters. However, Katrina victims still maintained 
a high level of unmet shelter needs during the second week post-landfall as temporary 
housing access was problematic and they could not return home. Unmet shelter needs for 
Rita peaked with acute requests for available beds, compounding Katrina victims with 
east Texan evacuees as well as two million of Houston and Galveston area residents 
evacuating early before Hurricane Rita shifted northward into the Texas-Louisiana 
border area (National Weather Service, n.d.). Texas residents were able to return home 
or to friends/families nearby, but Katrina victims still required sheltering until they could 
seek temporary housing, as shown in the surge of unmet rental housing needs 3 weeks 
post-landfall (Figure 4.2). Following this extended sheltering period, the number of 
unmet shelter needs returned close to baseline levels throughout recovery. Ongoing 
access to sheltering before and after disaster response seemed to have minimal access 
barriers and unmet needs, thus it was assumed to be handled successfully by routine 







Figure 4.3. Unmet shelter needs over time in Texas, fall 2005 
 
 
 The number of unmet ownership housing needs dropped slightly following 
Hurricane Katrina emergency phase (Figure 4.4), perhaps with Texan housing financial 
and maintenance services preoccupied with helping Katrina victims’ transition into 
temporary housing. After a week post-Katrina, these unmet needs returned to baseline 
levels. During emergency response for Hurricane Rita there was a considerable drop in 
unmet ownership housing needs corresponding to a peak in seeking shelter. After the 
week following Rita landfall, unmet ownership housing needs continued to rise weekly 
until they peaked a month post-landfall. Likely, there was a rise in disaster-related repair 
and financial needs and winter season-related needs. By year-end, calls were lower than 






Figure 4.4. Unmet ownership housing needs over time in Texas, fall 2005  
 
 The number of 2-1-1 calls per week was plotted to compare volume and patterns 
of the three major housing types throughout the 5-month study period (Figure 4.5). As 
expected, unmet rental housing needs were remarkably higher than other housing types, 
indicating more encounters with access barriers in seeking financial help and locating 
resources. Only during holidays (Thanksgiving and Christmas) was there a reduction in 
requests for rental housing unmet needs. Unmet rental needs fluctuated inversely with 
shelter needs during the emergency response phases. It was speculated that renters 
comprised a significant component of those encountering access barriers to seeking 
shelter, compounded with the influx of Katrina evacuees overwhelming sheltering 
resources in Texas. In turn, the rise in unmet rental needs coincided with evacuees 




related to both rental housing and shelter returned to baseline levels following the seven 
weeks of emergency and intermediate response for both hurricanes.   
 
 




 In contrast, unmet needs for ownership housing were minimal and varied little 
throughout the disaster phases, perhaps indicating their encountering the fewest access 
barriers. There was a slight drop in unmet ownership needs during emergency response 
to Hurricane Rita, corresponding with the rise in unmet sheltering needs. These needs 
dropped during the holidays as well. The rise in unmet ownership needs after one month 
post-Rita did not correspond to unmet need patterns of the other housing types. On one 



































































































































































On the other hand, this rise in unmet needs may have been driven by FEMA or insurance 
funding deadlines for disaster repairs.  
 
Summary and Conclusions  
 This study addressed two questions: 1) What are the types of unmet housing 
needs most frequently encountered after a disaster? and 2) When is assistance needed, 
according to housing type, across the various disaster phases? An analysis of Texas 2-1-
1 data enabled this investigation of unmet needs in 254 Texas counties before, during, 
and after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita (a five month study period). This large geographic 
scope captured the unmet needs not only in the disaster areas, but also in evacuation host 
locations. Analyzing the volume of 2-1-1 calls regarding unmet housing needs was a 
way to use unique, real-time data to track the various access barriers faced by vulnerable 
populations. If the volume of unmet needs was high, it meant there were a greater 
number of access barriers to the available resources. If the volume of unmet needs was 
low, then those needs were met directly in the vulnerable populations’ respective 
communities by available programs and services. 
 The greatest proportion of 2-1-1 calls recorded during the study period was for 
unmet housing needs (28%). Of the callers who identified their type of housing, renters 
comprised the largest group (59%), followed by those encountering barriers seeking 
shelter (30%), then homeowners with unmet needs (10%). Financial problems related to 
rental housing was the most frequent barrier. The volume of unmet needs related to 




pattern occurred for both hurricane events; the volume of renters’ unmet needs increased 
during the intermediate disaster phases, times when evacuees needed to move out of 
shelters and into temporary housing.  
 Shelter-related unmet needs comprised almost half the volume of rental housing 
unmet needs, indicating that shelter dwellers or individuals who sought a shelter had 
fewer experiences with access barriers despite the extraordinary demand for disaster 
shelters by Katrina victims (a problem which was later compounded by Rita evacuees). 
Although the total number of community shelter beds is not known, the number of 
routine unmet needs in shelters was consistently low, perhaps indicating that these needs 
were addressed directly in local communities and with minimal access barriers. In 
contrast, unmet needs for disaster-related shelters in Texas were considerable during the 
evacuation and emergency response phases for both Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. During 
the Rita emergency phase there was a large spike in calls seeking help to find shelter, a 
problem which was compounded by individuals already in shelters due to Katrina and 
the large number who evacuated early from Houston. The comparatively larger number 
of unmet needs in shelters extended into the intermediate phase following Hurricane 
Katrina, especially for evacuees who had no place to which they might return. This same 
pattern of an increased number of extended needs for shelter occurred in the week 
following Hurricane Rita, beyond the time when shelters began closing. The number of 
unmet needs subsided to a more routine level of community shelter needs for abuse 
victims, runaways, the homeless, and special needs crises after the third week post-Rita, 




 The volume of ownership housing-related unmet needs was much less than that 
of rental housing or shelter-related needs, reflecting that homeowners encountered fewer 
access barriers in directly seeking support services. Of the barriers experienced, about 
half of the unmet ownership needs were related to financial issues and the other half 
were related to getting help for repairs and other home modifications. There was a slight 
dip in homeowners’ unmet needs during the emergency response phases of both 
hurricanes. During the respective recovery phases, however, the volume of unmet needs 
for ownership housing increased, with individuals seeking help with disaster-related 
repairs and winter preparations. In addition, help was requested regarding the deadlines 
for homeowners seeking to file disaster damage claims with their insurance companies 
and FEMA.  
 Overall, unmet shelter needs clearly showed different patterns of demand 
according to the associated disaster phase, as compared with more subtle changes in the 
volumes of unmet rental and ownership housing needs. As expected, unmet shelter needs 
spiked during emergency response phases and fell almost back to a normal baseline after 
two weeks post-landfall. Renters’ needs rose as shelters closed, with displaced disaster 
victims encountering access barriers to temporary housing and in qualifying for public 
housing assistance. The volume of unmet needs for ownership housing varied little over 
time, but did rise one month post-Rita, when the volumes of the unmet needs of other 






Comparisons with the Literature and Contributions  
 The study results support the previous literature regarding patterns related to 
disaster housing (see Quarantelli, 1982, 1995). Furthermore, this study showed the 
lengths of time for peaks in unmet housing needs according to each housing type, from 
before a disaster to 14 weeks after a disaster. Decades ago Haas, Kates, and Bowden 
(1977) presented their disaster model of recovery activities and Quarantelli (1982, 1995) 
specified a disaster sheltering and housing typology. However, little research has 
empirically illustrated these theoretical longitudinal patterns of how shelter and housing 
needs change during disasters, and how long it might take to become normal. In this 
study of unmet housing needs during hurricane disasters, the peaks in unmet shelter 
needs occurred right before and at hurricane landfall, as expected, but extended to two 
weeks after landfall. This extension was due to problems with moving evacuees into 
temporary housing, since they were not able to return home. Unmet shelter needs 
quickly returned to nearly baseline levels for local shelters that normally served as 
refuge for the homeless and/or abused. Then the volume of unmet needs related to rental 
housing increased; shelter needs became easier to meet once the evacuees seeking 
temporary housing in shelters began to leave and seek more permanent housing 
elsewhere (i.e., from a week after the landfall through another two weeks beyond). In 
contrast, there was a rise in unmet ownership housing needs one month post-Rita. These 
patterns indicate when the temporary housing phases and the permanent housing phases 
began. They also indicate that each disaster housing phase is not mutually exclusive, as 




sheltering phase ended, even during the time when unmet shelter needs peaked, unmet 
rental housing needs began to increase. Additionally, when unmet ownership housing 
needs peaked, the volume of unmet shelter needs was still higher than it was before the 
disaster, which indicated the “overlap of phases”. Furthermore, among the three housing 
types, the most vulnerable housing type after a disaster was the shelter. On the other 
hand, rental housing was vulnerable both before and after a disaster, as compared to 
ownership housing. This also shows that renters and owners may experience different 
levels of difficulty during different periods of time. This study provides empirical 
evidence that can support the theoretical model of housing-related disaster phases based 
on real-time data.  
 
Recommendations for Disaster Managers and Communities  
 The volume of unmet rental housing needs indicated that community planners 
and policy makers needed to address high demand for rental housing assistance, as well 
as to lower financial barriers for disaster victims (in particular, rent and deposit 
assistance and support for public housing eligibility, low income/subsidized rental 
housing, and Section 8 financial assistance). Homeowners seemed to have significantly 
fewer access barriers than the individuals trying to meet rental and shelter housing unmet 
needs.   
 An unexpected barrier confronted by Texas communities hosting Katrina 
evacuees were conflicts in eligibility for subsidized public housing, as well as eligibility 




employment services. The evacuees who lived in unsubsidized rental housing also faced 
difficulties regarding the gaps in housing cost between their original and host areas. For 
example, as of 2005 the monthly area median income of Louisiana was $548 lower than 
that of Texas; additionally, the fair market price to rent a two-bedroom apartment in 
Louisiana was $103 lower than that of Texas (Wardrip, Pelletiere, & Crowley, 2005). 
These interstate differences became problematic not during the emergency response 
phase when federal funds supported the housing relief, but rather when individuals 
sought temporary and permanent housing because their original homes and 
neighborhoods had been devastated. Thus, disaster planning and policy making should 
consider mechanisms to facilitate interstate criteria and emergency funds to bridge the 
gap in eligibility for financial support and housing programs.  
 Policy makers need to consider extending services for a longer period of time. 
The length of the assistance should differ depending on the extent of the disaster. The 
American Red Cross usually provides emergency shelter for up to two weeks, but 
evacuees needed to stay in emergency shelters for up to seven weeks during Hurricane 
Katrina (Mitchell, Esnard, & Sapat, 2012). Although the study results indicated that 
unmet shelter needs were critical up to two to three weeks after each hurricane, until 
about ten weeks after the hurricanes the volume of unmet shelter needs was still higher 
than it was prior to the disasters. It is possible that the volume of unmet rental and 
ownership housing needs might also surge later or consist at some different level of 
volume during long-term recovery, but this study’s results only examined unmet housing 




 Moreover, policy makers should also consider improving assistance for evacuee 
host areas in the case of catastrophic disaster. Although Hurricane Katrina did not 
directly affect Texas, many evacuees came to Texas (e.g., Houston, Dallas) to seek 
shelter. Aid directed toward meeting temporary housing needs was essential for 
evacuees who were not able to return to their original homes. The study results showed 
an increase in rental housing needs in Texas after Hurricane Katrina. In the case of 
Hurricane Katrina, many of the evacuees were low income (Texas Health and Human 
Services Commission, 2006); thus, disaster relief efforts must also include the support of 
affordable housing programs. Furthermore, evacuee host areas must also serve the 
everyday needs of residents in addition to the special needs of evacuees, which stretches 
what are often limited budgets (Bame et al., 2012). As a result, host areas might also 
require additional resources.   
 
Recommendations for Future Research 
 In order to better predict and plan for unmet housing needs, future research is 
needed to analyze the temporal and spatial changes that have occurred in shelter and 
housing needs, especially in terms of tracking unmet needs by disaster phase and 
location. Analyzing this information according to the different units of analysis (county, 
city, ZIP code, or neighborhood level) could be a way to develop comprehensive 
strategies for policy makers and disaster managers. Comparisons between urban and 
rural areas could offer implications for certain allocations of resources. In this study, 




emergency needs for evacuees. Research should consider differences in the volume of 
needs pre- and post-disaster. Moreover, exploring specific needs of shelter and housing 
over time—public shelter vs. motel/hotel, or subsidized rental housing vs. market-rate 
rental housing— can provide better suggestions for policy makers and emergency 
managers hoping to effectively allocate resources in anticipation of a future disaster. 
These real-time 2-1-1 data snapshots taken before, during, and after disasters provide an 




CHAPTER V  
COMMUNITY FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH THE HOUSING NEEDS OF 
OWNERS VS. RENTERS DURING A DISASTER: A CASE STUDY OF 
HURRICANES KATRINA AND RITA IN TEXAS 
 
Introduction  
 Low income households, and in particular low income renters, suffer from 
disproportionately severe circumstances during disaster recovery (Quarantelli, 1995). In 
the beginning of the 21st century, the U.S. struggled with a lack of affordable housing, in 
particular for renters (Belsky, Goodman, & Drew, 2005; Belsky & Drew, 2007). Low 
income households often have little choice in the quality and location of housing because 
of a limited number of affordable housing options (Schwartz, 2006). As a result, they 
have a greater chance of living in poor housing conditions (Belsky & Drew, 2007; 
Kreimer, 1980; Morrow, 1999; Peacock & Girard, 1997) and in unsafe locations 
(Morrow, 1999; Phillips, 1993), which lead to higher losses after a disaster. Along with 
housing issues prior to a disaster, the inequality of recovery leads to more complex 
housing issues after a disaster, including finding affordable temporary housing. The 
purpose of this study is to test a model of community factors known to affect housing 
needs during normal times in order to determine the relationship and significance of 
these factors under disaster conditions. A further aim is to differentiate this model for 




 Researchers have determined that housing needs are affected by affordability, 
availability, and quality of housing during normal times. However, in disaster situations 
the housing needs model would require additional factors such as how the location 
relates to a disaster site (i.e., areas directly affected by the disaster vs. evacuation 
destinations), or how the time relates to the disaster (e.g., before, during, or after a 
disaster). This study modified the housing needs model to examine how significant 
factors during normal times would be associated during disaster with housing needs of 
owners and of renters using data from the Texas 2-1-1 caller dataset of actual housing 
needs over time and location. The Texas 2-1-1 caller dataset was provided by the 2-1-1 
Texas Information and Referral Network (TIRN), which contained call records relating 
to non-emergency needs. This unique real-time dataset offered a comprehensive 
assessment of housing needs within a broad geographical area—Texas’s entire 254 
counties, including both disaster areas and major/minor evacuation destinations—
throughout Hurricanes Katrina and Rita disaster phases, fall 2005.  
 The results of this study provide valuable information for disaster planning by 
identifying a more complete portrayal of actual housing needs. In this study, the housing 
needs emerging from the two extensive hurricane disasters—Katrina and Rita—were 
analyzed by disaster phase in broad geographical areas. Also, the study area covers both 
evacuation host communities from Hurricane Katrina and disaster affected communities 
from Hurricane Rita. Thus, community leaders and policymakers could use this study to 
help them understand how to manage assistance efficiently during the preparation, 




researchers could use the information presented here to assist them in better 
understanding which community factors are associated with housing needs, and how 
these relationships change when the temporal aspects of a disaster are considered, in 
particular for both owners and renters.  
 
Background    
Conceptual Framework of Housing Needs  
 Previous housing needs models can be grouped into two types based on distinct 
time periods: current housing needs (e.g., Heumann, 1976) and future housing needs 
(e.g., Holmans, 1995; Myers, Pitkin, & Park, 2002). This study’s model is adapted from 
a current housing needs model (i.e., the Illinois housing model) and HUD’s “worst case 
housing needs” model. The Illinois housing model has three key elements: substandard 
housing units, overcrowding, and excessive housing costs (Heumann, 1976). HUD’s 
“worst case housing needs” model uses three categories to classify the stock of 
affordable housing: 1) affordable; 2) affordable and available; and 3) affordable, 
available, and adequate (Steffen et al., 2011, p. 13). The conceptual model tested in this 
study is illustrated in Figure 5.1, with three major dimensions used to account for 
likelihood of housing needs: affordability, availability, and quality. This standard model 
is then modified according to disaster phase and disaster site designated locations. Two 







































Figure 5.1. Model of community factors associated with owner vs. renter housing needs 
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 Previous research found that renters endured greater affordability problems than 
owners. Moreover, low income renters often had very little opportunity to select their 
housing location due to limited number of affordable and available housing units 
(Schwartz, 2006). Renters also struggle with inadequate housing quality and 
overcrowding conditions, as compared with owners (see detail in U.S. Census Bureau, 
2011). In rental housing units, including multifamily housing, little can be done by 
renters to prepare for a disaster such as installing shutters or other types of window 
protection (Morrow 1999). Also, housing units for low income are often located in 
hazardous areas (Morrow, 1999; Phillips, 1993). Multifamily housing units were found 
more likely to be affected than single family housing units during the Loma Prieta and 
Northridge earthquakes (Comerio, 1997). A great deal of low income rental housing was 
destroyed or severely damaged during Hurricanes Andrew, Katrina, and Ike (Morrow, 
1997a; National Low Income Housing Coalition, 2005; Henneberger, 2009). Moreover, 
it takes more time for multifamily housing units to recover from disasters than it does 
single family housing (Lu, 2008). Multifamily housing units, many of which are rental 
housing units, are not easily restored to be the same as they were pre-disaster. This 
means that some renters need to relocate permanently, and may even need to move to 
another city, county, or state. 
 
Housing Affordability  
 Housing affordability is one of the major housing issues faced during normal, 




NAR, housing wage, etc.), the HUD affordability index is a conventional measure that is 
most commonly used (Jewkes & Delgadillo, 2010). The HUD affordability index (the 
ratio of housing costs to income) indicates a cost burden if the ratio is over 30 percent 
(Belsky, Goodman, & Drew, 2005). Recently, Tang (2012) and Bramley et al. (2010) 
used multiple housing affordability measurements for more reliable results. 
Consequently, this study considered using two aspects measuring housing affordability: 
individual affordability and market affordability. Following the definition provided by 
Jewkes and Delgadillo (2010), individual affordability is considered here to be “how 
much a household can afford on mortgage payments without facing a housing cost 
burden” (p. 48). They explain that market affordability is “the general affordability of a 
given area as measured by the median home price in that area” (p. 48). In this study, 
individual affordability is measured by the percentage of households spending 30 
percent or more of their income on gross rent or monthly owner costs, by county. Market 
affordability is calculated as a price-to-income ratio of a given county (i.e., a county’s 
median gross rent or median monthly owner mortgage cost divided by the county’s 
monthly median household income).   
 
Housing Availability  
 Housing availability has been used to evaluate housing needs for state and 
federal-level reports (e.g., 2013 State of Texas low income housing plan and annual 
report, HUD’s worst case housing needs 2009). There are certain gaps between demand 




housing unit at a price less than 30 percent of a household’s income, generally 
considered to be the standard for housing affordability. This study used five measures of 
housing availability: housing density, percent of rental housing units, vacancy, public 
housing, and Section 8 vouchers. In order to measure potential loss and recovery needs, 
researchers often use ‘density’ and ‘renter-occupied units.’ High-density areas are more 
likely to have greater loss (Cutter, Boruff, & Shirley, 2003; Mitchell, 1999), and 
evacuation difficulties (Cova & Church, 1997) during disasters. Hence, high-density 
areas (i.e., urban areas) will possibly have many needs relating to evacuation and 
recovery. In particular, catastrophic disasters have a significant impact on high-density 
areas, not only those directly affected by the disaster, but also those that serve as evacuee 
hosts areas (as the disaster will result in many shelter and temporary housing needs). 
Renters are especially vulnerable during disasters (Morrow, 1999). For example, they 
have little choice when searching for affordable shelter as well as often lack information 
resources to inform them about financial assistance (Cutter, Boruff, & Shirley, 2003).   
 
Housing Quality  
 Improving housing quality was an important issue during the last century 
(Belsky, Goodman, & Drew, 2005). Researchers used physical characteristics to 
measure housing quality, such as: lack of plumbing, heating, electrical systems or 
maintenance (HUD’s “worst case housing needs”; Steffen et al., 2011, p. 1), lack of 
plumbing, heating, electricity, or upkeep (U.S. Census Bureau 2011, p. A-21), and lack 




Affairs, 2013). This study used three measures of housing quality: no heating fuel, a lack 
of plumbing facilities, and overcrowding. Since residents living in overcrowded 
conditions often experience substandard housing conditions, the housing quality 
category includes overcrowding. Overcrowding could also indicate a lack of affordable 
housing options, because people are being forced to choose smaller-sized houses than 
might be appropriate for their household size in order to reduce their housing cost 
burden. The standard used for overcrowding has gone through several changes; for this 
study, the standard of overcrowding is more than one person per room. 
 
Housing Needs by Phase of Disaster and Location of Disaster 
 To use the housing needs model in disaster situations, two additional factors have 
been included: the phase of the disaster and the location of the disaster. Housing needs in 
disaster-related literature centered on shelter and temporary housing (Johnson, 2007; 
Mitchell, Esnard, & Sapat, 2012), relocation (Elliott & Pais, 2006; Girard & Peacock, 
1997; Morrow, 1997a), and housing recovery (Comerio, 1997; Zhang & Peacock, 2010; 
Lu, Peacock, Zhang, & Dash, 2007; Mukherji, 2010). These previous studies focused 
primarily on a single disaster phase. Additionally, their study locations usually involved 
areas directly affected by a disaster in order to examine housing damage and recovery. 
There has been little study of evacuation destinations such as neighboring counties or 
states. In cases of catastrophic disasters such as Hurricane Katrina, not only areas 
directly affected by the disaster but also evacuation destinations faced housing issues 




Texas counties designated by FEMA as Hurricane Rita disaster areas as compared 
evacuation destinations where every Texas county reported receiving evacuees from 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.   
 The volumes and types of housing needs for owners versus renters are different 
prior to a disaster, as well as post-disaster (see Chapter IV). Previous studies relating to 
housing tenure focused on a certain period before or after a disaster, such as: 
preparedness (Burby, Steinberg, & Basolo, 2003), post-disaster sheltering situations 
(Elliott & Pais, 2006), and housing recovery (Comerio, 1997; Zhang & Peacock, 2010; 
Mukherji, 2010). Yet few studies have examined the housing needs of owners and 
renters throughout the various disaster phases.  
 
Hurricane Katrina and Rita in Texas and Texas 2-1-1 
 In 2005, Texas experienced unprecedented housing and sheltering needs due to 
sequential disasters—Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Hurricane Katrina, the costliest 
hurricane in U.S. history to date (Lott, Ross, Smith, Houston, & Shein, 2011), made 
landfall in Louisiana on August 29, 2005. Of the 1.3 million evacuees, over 400,000 
came to Texas (Community Affairs Department, 2006) and required both shelter and 
temporary housing, particularly in the large urban areas (e.g., Dallas, Houston, and San 
Antonio). Less than a month later, Hurricane Rita arrived on the Texas and Louisiana 
borders. Hurricane Rita caused about 111 deaths in Texas, including 90 deaths related to 
the mass evacuation process (Zachria & Patel, 2006), displaced over three million people 




Housing Information Service, 2007). Many of the Katrina evacuees in the Houston area 
were required to evacuate a second time, and find other shelters and temporary housing 
facilities.  
 The 2-1-1 three-digit phone number is a contact number for non-emergency 
needs in normal times. The 2-1-1 Texas Information and Referral Network is a 
communication hub for callers asking for help and for information regarding available 
resources and services. As 2-1-1 has assisted in meeting disaster-related needs during the 
H1N1 and various wildfire crises, Texas 2-1-1 helped to address disaster-related needs 
(as well as routine, non-emergency community needs) after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
During these crisis times, 2-1-1 calls surged; as a result, many unmet disaster-related 
needs were recorded at the 2-1-1 call centers (Bame et al., 2012).  
 
Methods 
Data Sources and Variables 
 This study drew from three data sources merged by county to examine what 
aggregated housing characteristics were associated with 2-1-1 callers’ unmet housing 
needs in that county: 1) U.S. Census data aggregated to Texas county-level, 2000; 2) 
HUD data of subsidized households per county, 2005; and 3) Texas 2-1-1 caller data 
aggregated to county-level, 2005. The scope of 2-1-1 data included each of Texas’ 254 
counties from August 1 through December 31, 2005 covering the period before, during, 




unit of analysis. The variables tested in the model were summarized in Table 5.1, along 
with the operational definitions.  
 
Table 5.1. Variable names and definitions of housing needs associated with                  
community factors and disaster characteristics  
 
Variable names Definitions Data sources References 
Housing needs     
Owner housing 
needs 
If a county received a call relating 
to unmet ownership housing 
needs  
Texas 2-1-1 data  
Renter housing 
needs 
If a county received a call relating 
to unmet rental housing needs 





Owner occupied units who pay 
30% or more income in mortgage 
and owner costs (%) 
U.S.Census 2000 
Summary file 3 
Dacquisto & Rodda 





Renter occupied units who pay 
30% or more income in gross rent 
(%) 
U.S.Census 2000 
Summary file 3 
Dacquisto & Rodda 
(2006); Jewkes & 
Delgadillo (2010); 






income (%)  
U.S.Census 2000 
Summary file 3 






Median gross rent/Median 
household income (%) 
U.S.Census 2000 
Summary file 3 




Housing density  Number of housing units/Square 
miles 
U.S.Census 2007 & 
U.S.Census 2000 
Cutter et al. (2003); 




units/Total occupied housing 
units (%) 
U.S.Census 2000 &  
American Community 
Survey (ACS) 2005  
Cutter et al. (2003); 
Finch et al. (2010);  
Van Zandt et al. (2012) 
Vacancy of all 
housing 
Vacant housing units/Total 
housing units (%)  
U.S.Census 2000 
Summary file 3 
Ganapati et al. (2012); 
Van Zandt et al. (2012) 
Public housing  Households reported receiving 
public housing/Total households 
(%) 
HUD 2005 &  
TSDC 2005 
Texas Department of 




Households reported receiving 
Section 8 vouchers/Total 
households (%) 
HUD 2005 &  
TSDC 2005 
Texas Department of 









Table 5.1. Continued  
 
Variable names Definitions Data sources References 
Housing quality    
No heating fuel Occupied housing units-no 
heating fuel (%) 
U.S.Census 2000 
Summary file 3 
Steffen et al. (2011) 
Lacking 
plumbing 
Occupied housing units-lacking 
complete plumbing facilities (%) 
U.S.Census 2000 
Summary file 3 
Heumann (1976); 
Steffen et al. (2011)  
Overcrowding Occupied housing units-person 
per room is 1.01 or more (%) 
U.S.Census 2000 
Summary file 3 
Heumann (1976);  
Myers et al. (2002)  
Disaster characteristics 
Disaster Area  1: disaster area (n=22 counties);  
0: non-disaster area; evacuation 
destination (n=232 counties) 
FEMA 2005  
Disaster Phases See detail in Table 5.2   
Notes. TSDC (Texas State Data Center at the University of Texas at San Antonio); U.S. Census 2007: Annual 
estimates of housing units for counties in Texas (HU-EST2006-04-48); HUD 2005: Picture of subsidized households 
 
 
The 2000 U.S. Census Summary File 3 was used to identify the variables of 
county housing characteristics: a) housing affordability (individual affordability for 
owners vs. renters, market affordability for owners vs. renters); b) housing availability 
(housing density, rental housing units, housing vacancy); and c) housing quality (no 
heating, lacking plumbing, overcrowding). The 2005 HUD database was used to 
determine two housing availability characteristics related to subsidized households per 
county: proportion of public housing and of Section 8 vouchers per total households. 
The 2005 Texas 2-1-1 caller database contained three variables: a) location 
(county and FEMA designated disaster area), b) call date (disaster phases), and c) unmet 
housing needs (renter vs. owner). Caller location data were aggregated to the county 
level, triangulating city, zip code and county information collected for where the caller 
was seeking information or referral help. The variable “Disaster Area” was determined 




assistance and/or public assistance” (Categories A and B) (FEMA, 2005). Twenty-two 
counties in eastern Texas were designated by FEMA as disaster areas from Hurricane 
Rita: Angelina, Brazoria, Chambers, Fort Bend, Galveston, Hardin, Harris, Jasper, 
Jefferson, Liberty, Montgomery, Nacogdoches, Newton, Orange, Polk, Sabine, San 
Augustine, San Jacinto, Shelby, Trinity, Tyler, and Walker (Figure 5.2). Although 
certain cities were designated as major evacuation destinations for both Katrina and Rita 
victims, all Texas counties reported receiving some evacuees. Thus, no separate 









 Date of the 2-1-1 call was aggregated into four disaster phases (Table 5.2). The 
pre-disaster phase included a baseline period of four weeks prior to Hurricane Katrina’s 
landfall in Louisiana. The second phase, Katrina-emergency, included Hurricane Katrina 
landfall, evacuation and sheltering until the declared evacuation for Hurricane Rita three 
weeks later. The third phase of Hurricane Rita-emergency included evacuation, 
sheltering and immediate recovery up through four weeks post-Rita landfall. The fourth 
phase was recovery from one month post-Rita up to the end of the study period, 14 
weeks after Hurricane Rita’s landfall. 
 
Table 5.2. Disaster phases of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, August 1–December 31, 2005 
 
Disaster phase Date Number of days Duration 
Pre-disaster 8/1–8/28 28 days 4 weeks before Katrina landfall 
Hurricane Katrina  8/29–9/20† 23 days Katrina landfall to 3 weeks after, until start of evacuation for Rita 
Hurricane Rita 9/21-10/21†† 31 days 3 days before and 4 weeks after Rita landfall  
Short-term recovery  10/22–12/31††† 71 days 5 to 14 weeks after Rita landfall 
Note.  † Hurricane Katrina phase starts from landfall, 8/29 (Knabb, Rhome, & Brown, 2005). 
         †† Hurricane Rita phase includes 3 days evacuation (Crawford & Company, 2005) before landfall, 9/24  
             (Knabb, Brown, & Rhome, 2006).   
            ††† Short-term recovery phase is up to 14 weeks (3 months) following Rita landfall in this study. 
 
   
 All 2-1-1 calls were assumed to be unmet needs, reflecting callers motivated to 
seek information or referral (I&R) to available and/or affordable community support 
services. Without encountering access barriers, callers would be connecting directly with 
community support services, with no reason to contact 2-1-1 I&R services.  For this 




health, food, transportation). These housing unmet needs (N=180,601) were then 
categorized according to housing types according to the nature of the caller’s need or 
type of referral documented: shelter, rental housing, ownership housing, public housing, 
group homes, and mobile homes. Public housing needs were included in the rental 
category as the narrative descriptions were similar to those of renters. Unmet shelter 
needs were not related to the purpose of this study and the other housing types were 
negligible, and thus, not included in the analysis. Unfortunately, 63% (N=113,884) of 
housing-related needs had no information about type of housing, and thus, could not be 
used for this analysis.  
  
Data Analysis 
 Logistic regression was used to test what characteristics in the multivariate model 
of housing affordability, availability, and quality were significant factors in whether or 
not unmet housing needs were experienced in a county by owners compared to renters 
according to disaster phase, adjusting for disaster location. The odds ratio and level of 
significance p ≤ 0.05 were calculated using STATA 11.2 (StataCorp, College Station, 
TX). If the odds ratio was < 1.0 then the relationship was negative; if > 1.0, the 
relationship was positive. If the odds ratio was = 1, there was no relationship. To code 
dichotomous unmet housing needs by renter vs. by owner per disaster phase per county, 
eight dependent variables were created: any call per county by owner-type vs. by renter-
type for each of the four disaster phases = 1; no calls for that type during that phase per 




Comparing and contrasting the eight models accounting for the likelihood of unmet 
housing needs encountered in counties determined differences and similarities in 
significant factors over disaster phases for either renters or homeowners or both.  
 
Limitations 
 The total number of calls was expected to be underestimated during each 
hurricane’s landfall because of 2-1-1’s difficulty in handling overwhelming call surges. 
However, these types of calls may be expected to be more concerned with evacuation 
and sheltering rather than other types of renter or owner housing needs. In addition, it 
should be noted that the number of calls relating to both ownership and rental housing 
was underestimated because of data missing regarding the type of housing specified; 
however, many of these calls were related to utility bills. Thus, the findings here might 
have unknown biases in this regard.  
 As stated above, the study population did not include people who met their needs 
using their own resources, knew where they should seek help, and had access to 
available and affordable services. Hence, the study population was more likely to be 
made up of vulnerable populations who had needs but encountered access barriers. 
Unfortunately, no socio-demographic or economic data were collected in the 2-1-1 
database so that comparisons to underlying census population characteristics could not 
be made. Nevertheless, these analyses would be useful for policy makers and community 
managers seeking location and timing of unmet needs in high-risk, vulnerable 




 Although this model of housing characteristics associated with community 
disaster resiliency is well known in the literature, no previous analyses have been found 
that investigate differences in comparing the significance of these factors across disaster 
phases. Moreover, this study’s analysis compared and contrasted the significance of 
those factors that accounted for unmet housing needs for renters as opposed to 
homeowners. Hence, this extensive analysis provided unique evidence of community 
housing factors that were significantly associated with unmet housing needs over time 
and across disaster phases as well as evacuation locations. 
 
Results 
Description of Unmet Housing Needs 
 During the five-month study period, 635,983 total 2-1-1 calls were recorded by 
the Texas Information & Referral Network. Approximately 28 percent (N=180,601) of 
the total calls were related to unmet housing and shelter needs. This was the largest 
proportion in comparison to other basic needs of health/safety (18%), food/water (15%), 
and transportation/fuel (4%). These needs were not independent, however, as callers 
presented with multiple types of needs and overlapping categories (e.g., shelter and food, 
transportation to medical facility).  
 The set of housing-related needs were categorized into housing types to identify 
the context of those needs and availability of referral services: 1) Rental housing (19.5%; 
N=35,267), 2) Shelter (11.1%; N=20,007), 3) Ownership housing (3.6%; N=6,542), 4) 




(0.02%; N=36), and 7) Housing-related needs with no information about type (63.1%; 
N=113,884). Rental housing type was merged with public housing as the nature of these 
needs were similar, resulting in a total of 21.8% (N=39,288) in this category. Owner 
housing needs were much less, comprising 4% of unmet housing needs (N=6,542). 
Unmet shelter needs were not related to the purpose of this study and the other housing 
types were negligible, and hence, not included in the analysis. 
  
Table 5.3. Number and proportion of Texas counties with any housing needs of owners 
vs. renters by disaster phase (N=254 counties) 
 
Housing needs Disaster phase 
Having any housing 
needs† 









Any housing needs 
(Owner or Renter) 
Pre-disaster 110 43.3% 144 56.7% 
Katrina 107 42.1% 147 57.9% 
Rita 135 53.1% 119 46.9% 
Short-term recovery 146 57.5% 108 42.5% 
All phases 181 71.3% 73 28.7% 
Owner housing needs Pre-disaster 67 26.4% 187 73.6% 
Katrina 74 29.1% 180 70.9% 
Rita 85 33.5% 169 66.5% 
Short-term recovery 94 37.0% 160 63.0% 
All phases 134 52.8% 120 47.2% 
Renter housing needs Pre-disaster 98 38.6% 156 61.4% 
Katrina 96 37.8% 158 62.2% 
Rita 121 47.6% 133 52.4% 
Short-term recovery 127 50.0% 127 50.0% 
All phases 163 64.2% 91 35.8% 
Note.  † The county had at least one call during the disaster phase.  
             †† The county had no call record during the disaster phase.  
           ††† % of counties is the ratio of # of counties over the total number of Texas counties (N=254)   







 The distribution of any housing needs by type and phase per county is 
summarized in Table 5.3. Seventy-one percent of Texas counties had at least one unmet 
housing need during the five-month study period. Of those 181 counties, 74% had an 
owner-related need and 90% had a renter-related need. The number of counties reporting 
any housing-related need increased as the disaster phases progressed. Approximately a 
quarter of Texas counties had any owner-related housing needs during the month prior to 
Hurricane Katrina, increasing to over a third of counties with any owner-related needs 
during recovery. Almost 40% of counties had any renter-related needs during the 
baseline phase, increasing to 50% of counties during recovery. 
 
Models Accounting for Likelihood of Any Unmet Housing Need by Owner vs. Renter 
across Disaster Phases 
 All logistic regression models had housing factors that significantly (p ≤ 0.05) 
accounted for the likelihood of owner and of renter unmet housing needs per county 
across all disaster phases (Table 5.4). Overall, the significant factors of the conceptual 
model differed by owner vs. renter unmet housing needs according to disaster phase. 
Affordability factors were significant during the baseline pre-disaster phase for both 
owners and renters. However, affordability was significant for just renters during both 
Hurricane Katrina’s and Rita’s emergency periods. During recovery, no significant 
affordability factors were found to account for likelihood of any unmet housing needs 
per county for either owners or renters. Availability factors were significantly related to 




Table 5.4. Logistic regression models predicting having unmet housing needs by ownership during four disaster phases  
(N= 254), odds ratios 
 
 Pre-disaster  Katrina Rita Short-term Recovery 















Affordability         
Individual affordability-
owner/renter     .936 1.186
*** 1.104 1.018 1.001 1.092* 1.057 1.006  
Market affordability- 
owner/renter   1.214
* 1.140 1.037 1.414* 1.060 1.096 1.116 1.081 
Availability         
Housing density  1.012* 1.010 1.023**  1.052** 1.035*** 1.039* 1.008 1.182*** 
Rental housing units   .939   .965    .987    .958 1.062   .987   .989 1.006  
Vacancy of all housing   .911**   .901***    .875***    .816***   .945*   .936*   .927**   .902** 
Public housing    .897   .770   .976   .904 1.015   .906   .655**   .979 
Section 8 vouchers   .928   .540*   .860   .920   .797   .819  1.014   .767 
Quality         
No heating fuel    .829   .787  1.795  1.423   .929 1.137 1.934    .743 
Lacking plumbing 1.068 1.010  1.287  1.295 1.222 1.195   .879  1.318 
Overcrowding   .964   .974    .926    .877   .912   .902   .919    .920 
Disaster Area 1.663   .490  2.420  2.185 16.598*** 8.497* 2.791    .659 
LR χ2  
Pseudo R2 
61.87*** 
  .211 
111.57*** 
  .329 
99.34*** 
  .324 
157.55*** 
  .468 
108.56*** 
  .335 
118.26*** 
  .336 
72.12*** 
  .215 
164.94*** 
  .468 






It was interesting to find that no housing quality factors were significant in testing the 
model. As expected, whether or not a county was in the FEMA designated disaster area 
was significant for Hurricane Rita’s emergency phase for both owners and renters. 
However, it was surprising that this factor was not significant for determining unmet 
housing needs during the recovery phase, particularly in the disaster area. 
In Table 5.5, the degree of significance and direction of the significant 
relationships are indicated for each variable to more easily compare and contrast the 
patterns of specific relationships for the eight logistic models. Within affordability, a 
greater likelihood of renters having unmet housing needs was associated with individual 
affordability during the baseline prior to Hurricane Katrina and during Hurricane Rita’s 
emergency phase when renters were perhaps looking to afford temporary housing or 
having to relocate. During Katrina’s emergency phase, renters’ likelihood of unmet 
housing needs was directly related to greater market affordability of rental costs. Market 
affordability of mortgage costs was significantly associated with homeowners’ unmet 
housing needs during the baseline phase only. No other affordability measure was 
related to owner’s likelihood of unmet housing needs. Hence, renters were more 
vulnerable to both individual and market affordability barriers throughout the disaster 
phases except during recovery. In contrast, homeowners were more likely to have unmet 
housing needs in higher priced mortgage markets during the baseline period but 
affordability barriers did not play a role in their housing needs thereafter during the 




Table 5.5. Comparing significant factors across models by phase and by owner vs. renter unmet housing needs  
 
 Pre-disaster  Katrina Rita Short-term Recovery 















Affordability         
Individual affordability-
owner/renter    +++    +   
Market affordability- 
owner/renter   +   +     
Availability         
Housing density  +  ++ ++ +++ +  +++ 
Rental housing units         
Vacancy of all housing - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Public housing        - -  
Section 8 vouchers  -       
Quality         
No heating fuel          
Lacking plumbing         
Overcrowding         




Odds Ratio >1.0: 
Positive relationship 
Odds Ratio  <1.0: 
Negative relationship 
p ≤ .05 + - 
p ≤ .01 ++ - - 





 Housing availability measures were significant in accounting for likelihood of 
unmet housing needs for both owners and renters throughout all disaster phases. Housing 
density, as a measure of city size, was a significant factor for homeowners’ likelihood of 
unmet housing needs during the baseline period and emergency phase of each hurricane 
but not during recovery. Homeowners in the larger cities were more likely to report 
unmet housing needs than those in smaller towns or rural areas. Once the disasters 
started, renters were significantly prone to experience housing needs in larger cities 
throughout the disaster phases, including recovery.  
 Housing vacancy rate was a significant factor in accounting for unmet housing 
needs for both homeowners and renters for the baseline period, emergency phase of each 
hurricane, and recovery phase. The lower the proportion of vacancies per total 
households the greater the likelihood of unmet housing needs. Hence, this measure was 
consistently significant for determining availability barriers in meeting housing needs 
whether during disasters or normal times.  
 Other availability barriers associated with unmet housing needs were subsidized 
housing factors. However, the type of measure and phase of significant association 
differed for owners vs. renters. During the baseline period, renters’ unmet housing needs 
were more likely in counties with lower proportions of available Section 8 vouchers. 
This factor was not significant for renters after the disasters started. In contrast, analysis 
of homeowners’ unmet housing needs was significantly associated with availability to 
public housing during recovery when their unmet housing needs were more likely in 




 Thus, renters’ unmet housing needs were more likely as they spent a greater 
proportion of their income on their housing as well as more vulnerable to housing unmet 
needs in higher-rent markets. Owners were also more likely to have unmet housing 
needs in higher-priced housing markets, but were not as vulnerable to variations during 
disaster phases. Neither renters nor owners had affordability factors during recovery, 
perhaps reflecting outside financial support for hurricane victims and evacuation 
communities during recovery from these two devastating disasters. Both renters and 
homeowners in larger cities reported a greater likelihood of unmet housing needs 
throughout the disaster emergency phases and continuing into recovery for renters. The 
most consistent factor throughout the study for both homeowners and renters was a 
greater likelihood of unmet housing needs as vacant available housing options 
decreased. A decrease in the proportion of public housing was associated with greater 
housing needs for homeowners and less Section 8 voucher availability was associated 
with renters’ greater likelihood of unmet housing needs. Both renters and homeowners 
had significantly greater unmet housing needs in Hurricane Rita’s disaster area; 
however, this diminished as they phased into recovery.  
 
Discussion  
 Three dimensions have been found to be related to housing needs–affordability, 
availability, and quality. In this study, measures of each dimension were analyzed 
according to unmet housing needs for homeowners compared to renters over a five-




sequential hurricanes, and over three months of recovery following Hurricane Rita. The 
findings of multivariate logistic analysis testing this model is discussed below according 
to each dimension in comparison to previous research findings in testing this model. 
 Market affordability was only related to homeowners during the baseline period, 
with no relationship to affordability measures affecting homeowners during disaster 
phases. As would be expected, typical higher average market home prices were 
associated with greater unmet housing needs reported by homeowners. But during 
disaster, this homeowner population was perhaps more resilient to find help to meet their 
own housing needs. In contrast, housing affordability was found to be an important issue 
for renters throughout the disaster phases analyzed in this study except for recovery. The 
greater proportion of income spent on rental housing, the more likely unmet needs were 
encountered. Market rental rates were a significant problem during Katrina’s emergency 
phase, perhaps indicating Katrina evacuees’ problems with Texas’ rental prices as they 
sought temporary housing. No significant relationships between affordability and unmet 
housing needs were found during recovery phase may indicate successful federal, state, 
and charitable support given to help hurricane victims’ housing needs in Texas.  
 In the U.S., the number of renters who suffered from housing cost burdens 
reached approximately 50 percent in 2011, including renters with severe cost burdens 
(27.6 percent) (Alexander et al., 2013b, Table A-3). Compared to renters, the number of 
owners who suffered from housing cost burdens was approximately 30 percent in 2011, 
including owners with severe cost burdens (12.6 percent) (Alexander et al., 2013b, Table 




Housing costs as a share of income increased from 26.6 percent to 32.2 percent from 
1990 to 2010, as the median renter income decreased, and gross rent increased (see 
Alexander et al., 2013a, Table A-1).  
 Housing availability was a key dimension related to the likelihood of unmet 
housing needs in this study, regardless of disaster phase or whether the 2-1-1 caller was 
a homeowner or renter. First, counties with greater housing density experienced greater 
likelihood of unmet housing needs. Hence, the larger urban areas were more at risk for 
vulnerability to housing problems, especially during the emergency phases of disasters 
and for renters during the recovery phase included in the study. Interestingly, this 
relationship did not hold for owners during recovery. As found above regarding 
affordability, perhaps the owners were more resilient and better able to navigate support 
help to meet their housing needs.  
 Regardless of disaster phase, vacancy was negatively related to both owner and 
renter unmet housing needs, implying that increasing the available housing stock could 
help reduce unmet housing needs. A more simple approach may be to implement free or 
low cost locator services to help the rental population meet their housing needs. 
However, in the U.S., a shortage in affordable housing stock has remained an issue, 
especially for lower income renters. According to the American Community Survey 
(ACS), in 2009 affordable and available housing units were 78 units per 100 very low 
income renters (30 to 50 percent of Area Median Income), but were only 41 units per 
100 extremely low income renters (30 percent of Area Median Income) (Collinson, 




rate compared with those of higher priced rental stocks from 2001 to 2011: 12.8 percent 
for housing units where the rent level was under $400, versus 3.0 percent for housing 
units where the rent level was $800 and greater (Alexander et al., 2013a, Table A-4). 
Although new construction has been one of the ways to fill the gap between demand and 
supply in affordable housing stock, the price of the new units would likely be too 
expensive for low income renters (Alexander et al., 2013b, p. 25). In 2010, the gross rent 
for existing units was $873, but asking price for new apartments was $1,134, which 
meant that housing costs as a share of income was 32.2 percent for existing stock, but 
that number increased to 41.8 percent for new stock (Alexander et al., 2013a, p. 42). 
Thus, policy makers need a strategy for increasing lower-priced affordable housing units 
and providing additional rental housing assistance particularly for disaster victims. 
 One of the unexpected results of this study was that the proportion of assisted 
housing in a community (public housing and Section 8 vouchers) had no relationship 
with unmet rental housing needs during disaster phases. However, greater availability of 
public housing units was significantly related to lower unmet housing needs of 
homeowners during the early recovery period. Perhaps greater access to low-income 
housing helped to reduce competition for lower priced housing, hence significantly 
reduced unmet housing needs for homeowners.   
 Although housing quality would be relatively important parameter in determining 
housing needs during normal times, none of the housing quality variables was associated 
with either owners’ or renters’ unmet housing needs throughout the disaster phases. Nor 




indicate an improvement in or satisfaction with housing quality in Texas communities. 
On the other hand, people may consider quality-related housing needs to be less urgent, 
particularly during disasters, or they may exchange inadequate conditions for a reduction 
in their financial burden. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) 
has published a report of worst case housing needs for very low income renters using 
data from the American Housing Survey. This report showed that the number of worst 
case needs has increased sharply, mostly due to a high rent to income ratio (Steffen et 
al., 2011). The major housing needs of very low income renters were related to severe 
rent burdens (about 93.8 percent of housing needs as a sole reason); the remaining 
housing needs (6.3 percent) were related to severely inadequate housing or both 
problems together (Steffen et al, 2011). Lastly, housing quality variables may be a 
significant factor in housing needs at the individual level, but not when measured at the 
aggregate level as found in this study using counties as the units of analysis.  
 Disaster area was added as a factor in determining likelihood of unmet housing 
needs simply as a logical way to control for disproportionate housing risk due to 
hurricane damage. As expected, this factor had a significant relationship with both 
unmet owners’ and renters’ housing needs during the emergency phase of Hurricane 
Rita. Interestingly, it had much stronger relationship with homeowners’ unmet needs 
than those reported by renters. However, it was a surprise that neither owners’ nor 
renters’ housing vulnerability for unmet needs differed during recovery. Previous 




ownership housing (Comerio, 1997, 1998; Peacock, Dash, & Zhang, 2007; Zhang & 
Peacock, 2010).  
 There were several reasons hypothesized why homeowners in the Hurricane Rita 
disaster area were significantly more likely to have unmet owner needs as compared 
with renters’ housing needs. First, the number of rental housing units damaged by 
Hurricane Rita was approximately 26 percent of the total damaged housing units, a 
relatively small number as compared to owned housing units (though this is not an 
insignificant percentage of the rental housing stock). Second, if there were no available 
rental housing units in a disaster-affected area, victims who were renters must find 
housing units in other areas. A significant number of Katrina evacuees went to metro 
areas in Texas (e.g., Houston, Dallas) (Ericson, Tse, & Wilgoren, 2005). Victims who 
were owners before the disaster were more likely to come back to their original homes 
earlier than their renter counterparts. Thus, the impact of the disaster area on 
homeowners’ needs would logically be greater. Third, rental housing needs were 
addressed later by disaster management organizations. Homeowner needs increased in 
terms of house repair as soon as the owners came back home. Alternatively, renters may 
be more likely to stay in temporary shelters during the same period of time, because they 
could not control whether or when they would go back to their original homes. For 
example, about nine months after Hurricane Katrina, 12 percent of evacuees were still 
living in someone else’s home or at temporary shelters (Texas Health and Human 




housing needs later than measured in this study, or that renters settled in other places 
permanently.  
 
Summary and Conclusions 
 In summary, this study tested a conceptual framework for understanding 
homeowners’ and renters’ unmet housing needs before, during, and following a disaster. 
Considerable research has examined models to explain housing needs in normal times; 
however, no previous study has investigated the factors associated with variations in 
unmet housing needs by disaster vs. evacuation areas and throughout disaster phases. 
Texas 2-1-1 caller data were used to identify unmet housing needs reported in real time 
within a broad geographical area (Texas’s 254 counties) ranging from four weeks before 
Hurricane Katrina through 14 weeks after Hurricane Rita landfall. These findings 
suggested that housing affordability and availability factors had substantial relationships 
on the likelihood of owners’ and renters’ unmet housing needs (Tables 5.4 and 5.5). 
Greater affordability barriers were related to significantly greater renters housing needs 
before and during the emergency phases but not during recovery. In contrast, 
homeowners had significant affordability issues prior to the Hurricanes but none were 
significant after the disaster phases started.  
 Availability characteristics were significantly related to the likelihood of unmet 
housing needs throughout the disaster phases for both homeowners and renters. Larger 
cities were more likely to have both homeowner and renter unmet housing needs during 




significantly greater likelihood for unmet housing needs during recovery. The greater 
proportion of availability of vacancies for both homeowners and renters, the less likely 
they were to have unmet housing needs during both normal times and all disaster phases. 
A greater proportion of public housing was associated with lower likelihood of 
homeowners’ unmet needs during the short-term recovery; whereas the proportion of 
housing available via Section 8 vouchers seemed to have no effect on renters’ unmet 
needs during disaster phases.  
 Surprisingly, housing quality measures were found to have no relationship with 
unmet housing needs over time or location for either homeowners or renters during this 
study period. As expected, unmet housing needs were significantly more likely for those 
in the declared disaster areas when Hurricane Rita hit Texas. However, location was not 
associated with housing needs during any of the other disaster phases. Thus, it seems 
that federal and state disaster financial support helped meet housing needs for both 
homeowners and renters during recovery, but limited vacancies were significantly 
problematic for both renters and owners before, during and following these compound 
Hurricane disasters, particularly more likely for those in larger cities.  
 
Comparing Factors Accounting for Housing Unmet Needs During Disasters  
 There were two unexpected results of this study as compared to models found in 
previous research that suggest consideration of housing policies throughout disaster 
phases. First, assisted housing variables (public housing and Section 8 vouchers) rarely 




may be linked to the influx of Katrina evacuees in Texas who were supported by federal 
housing funds. Further, the percent of households receiving public housing or Section 8 
vouchers only reflected Texas residents and would not include Katrina evacuees, hence, 
interfering with relationships between assisted housing availability and unmet rental 
housing needs during other disaster phases. Thus, this result might suggest that assisted 
housing-related programs may need more funding in evacuation destinations as well as 
financial support for housing in disaster locations.   
 A second unexpected finding was that during Hurricane Rita’s emergency phase, 
counties in disaster areas had a stronger significant relationship with unmet housing 
needs of homeowners than renters. Based on previous research, it was hypothesized that 
disaster areas would have much a more significant association with rental housing and 
for longer periods of time. The reasons why this study showed different results may be 
hypothesized as follows: 1) a comparatively smaller proportion of rental housing units 
than houses were damaged by Hurricane Rita, 2) evacuee host areas were likely to have 
increasing rental housing needs because of the significant number of evacuees that 
relocated, and 3) there may have been a surge in rental housing needs later in recovery 
beyond the scope of time in this study, as many renters remained in temporary housing 
in other areas due to unrepaired housing and/or no affordable alternative housing in their 
original place of residence.   
 Other than those two findings of this study, the significant factors largely 
supported the proposed model accounting for housing unmet needs; however, with some 




with previous housing needs models in the literature examined during normal times. The 
only factor consistently related to unmet housing needs for both renters and owners 
throughout the baseline and disaster phases was an inverse relationship with vacancy—
the lower the vacancy rate the greater the likelihood of unmet housing needs.  
 Rental housing was the more vulnerable housing type. More counties struggled 
with unmet rental housing needs than with unmet needs of homeowners. In our study, 
renters in larger cities had significantly greater likelihood of having unmet housing 
needs throughout disaster phases, whereas urban homeowners had significantly greater 
likelihood of housing needs during the emergency phases of both Hurricanes Katrina and 
Rita but not during recovery.  
 As previous research has focused on rental housing affordability (Belsky & 
Drew, 2007; Belsky, Goodman, & Drew, 2005; Collinson, 2011; Tang, 2012), this study 
showed that housing affordability was a significant problem for renters through the 
various disaster phases but not for homeowners. Policy makers should consider 
increasing the affordable housing stock as well as supporting locator services for low 
cost rental availability along with greater access to rental housing financial assistance. 
The results show that housing quality issues were less urgent types of needs. Yet, it 
should be remembered that other studies had found that people usually trade off these 
types of quality issues in order to reduce housing cost burdens (Belsky & Drew, 2007; 
Belsky, Goodman, & Drew, 2005). Among housing assistance programs, public housing 
and Section 8 vouchers have been essential for low income households. Funding from 




percent of eligible low income families were served by this program (Rice & Sard, 
2007). The Section 8 Housing Choice Vouchers program provided rent assistance to 2.1 
million low-income people in 2012, but the budget sequestration in 2013 forced a cut of 
about 50,000 vouchers (Rice, 2014). Thus, more funding for these housing assistance 
programs should be reconsidered.    
 During and immediately following disasters, homeowner and renter housing 
needs would require different policies and programs because of the different factors that 
affected the variation in housing needs that occurred during each disaster phase. During 
the emergency phase including immediate response and early recovery, homeowner 
needs increased with regards to mitigation and management issues of housing damage in 
disaster-affected areas, unless owners were to relocate permanently to other areas as 
experienced with Katrina victims. First, owners housing needs in disaster-affected areas 
were likely related to the repair or rebuilding of damaged housing units. Previous 
research has pointed out that disaster recovery programs and policies assist middle class, 
single-family homeowners best (Bolin & Stanford, 1991; Bolin & Stanford, 1998; 
Comerio, 1998). Thus, housing recovery programs would need to expand to encompass 
low income households, particularly in minority neighborhoods where the speed of 
recovery was found to be slower (Zhang & Peacock, 2010).  
 Second, rental housing needs in disaster-affected areas may be categorized into 
two types: the recovery of damaged rental housing units, and the provision of temporary 
housing. Rental housing needs related to housing recovery usually require more time 




housing units, and large buildings in particular, faced greater difficulties such as poor 
financial status due to a lack of cash flow and equity, as well as the limited availability 
of assistance programs due to complex ownership (Comerio, 1997). Three years after 
Hurricane Katrina, only 11 percent of the rental housing stock was available for 
occupancy among the 24,600 rental housing units that were allocated to be repaired with 
recovery assistance (Rose, Clark, & Duval-Dlop, 2008). Thus, strategies would be 
needed to reduce recovery times for renters who need household repairs. Until their 
rental units are repaired or rebuilt, disaster victims looked for temporary housing near 
their original home locations, which might result in increased rent near disaster-affected 
areas. Renters in New Orleans struggled much more with housing costs than did 
homeowners; more than half of the renters were paying more than 35 percent of their 
income in housing costs more than five years after Hurricane Katrina (Plyer, Ortiz, 
Horwitz, & Hobor, 2013). In addition, public housing residents have been struggling. 
For example, five years after Hurricane Ike in 2008, rebuilding or rehabilitation of public 
housing was still a complicated matter (Wilder, 2013).  
 Third, rental housing needs in evacuee host areas should be considered in cases 
of catastrophic disaster. If victims cannot find temporary housing units near their 
original homes, victims may need to travel to a different city or state, often attracted to 
larger cities where there are more available rental units and job opportunities. Then they 
may face additional barriers, such as higher costs of living. For example, Katrina 
evacuees sent to Austin found that rent was much higher and there were less available 




previous public housing residents faced difficulties when attempting to transfer to 
different public housing accommodations (Lein et al., 2006, p. 15). Nine months after 
Hurricane Katrina, about 84 percent of evacuees stayed in rental housing, and only three 
percent had bought a condo or house in Texas (Texas Health and Human Services 
Commission, 2006). Without housing assistance, many of Katrina’s evacuees struggled 
with their housing costs. Thus, disaster housing policy makers need strategies for 
disaster areas that deal with the recovery of damaged rental housing units as well as for 
evacuation destinations that deal with displaced victims, in particular those individuals 
who will have difficulties due to housing price gaps between their previous and current 
locations.  
 
Recommendations for Disaster Managers and Communities!!
 To reduce the housing cost burden of disasters, recommendations would be to not 
only increase affordable housing stock, but also provide more funding for rental housing 
assistance. Thus, a strategy would be needed for expanding the stock of available lower-
priced affordable housing units and for providing additional rental housing assistance. 
Even before a disaster, the stock of affordable housing may already be insufficient, then 
access barriers compounded by losses during a disaster. Policymakers should understand 
that the types of factors affecting unmet needs for homeowners vs. renters would likely 
be different, depending on the type and disaster phase. Hence, different strategies and 
programs would be needed during the different time periods surrounding a disaster and 




 Disaster-related homeowner needs occurring in disaster areas would usually 
involve repair or rebuilding damaged housing units. Disaster-related rental housing 
needs, however, occur not only in disaster areas, but also in evacuation destinations. In 
disaster areas, recovery programs would be needed for both ownership housing and 
rental housing inhabitants, and in particular for low income households (see Zhang & 
Peacock, 2010). The recovery speed for rental housing has been shown to be slower than 
for ownership housing; thus, strategies are needed to reduce recovery times for rental 
housing. In addition, disaster areas, as well as evacuee host areas, would need to provide 
temporary housing at an affordable price for renters who need a place to stay until their 
housing units are repaired or rebuilt. And specifically, evacuee destinations need 
financial disaster support to bridge the housing price differences between the evacuees’ 
original and current locations.  
 
Recommendations for Future Research 
 This investigation of homeowners vs. renters unmet housing needs was 
successful in demonstrating that different factors affected these different groups varying 
according to disaster phase. This laid the groundwork to generate hypotheses about what 
kinds of housing needs occurred for whom and when. In future studies, researchers 
should also examine differences according to disaster areas compared to evacuation 
destinations in order to examine variations in factors affecting housing needs. Further, 
distinguishing unmet needs with regards to whether or not they were specifically 




according to disaster-related needs versus local community needs. This would be 
especially helpful for mitigating the impact of evacuation of large urban areas into 
destinations with community resources already stressed by previous disaster(s) or other 
economic or social upheaval. Lastly, this study may provide a template for future 
research using 2-1-1 data to examine unmet needs in real time over time for other types 
of disasters and responses that reduce risk for these vulnerable populations in other 







CHAPTER VI  
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
  
 The purpose of this study was to examine unmet housing needs during disasters, 
investigating the case of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita experiences in Texas over a five-
month study period, fall 2005. Using the Texas 2-1-1 Information and Referral 
Network’s (TIRN) dataset, information was captured about unmet needs of callers in 
“real time” throughout the state’s 254 counties. The dissertation is a compellation of four 
manuscripts for publication, recognizing that these working papers are in various stages 
of finalizing for submission. These papers cover the typical aspects included in a 
dissertation, i.e., literature review, methods, descriptive findings, and multivariate 
findings. The first chapter was an introduction to the organization of the dissertation and 
a brief overview of the background of the study.   
 
Summary of Key Findings and Conclusions  
 Chapter II, “Differences between Renters’ and Owners’ Housing Needs During 
Disasters,” focused on reviewing the literature of previous research regarding differences 
between renters’ and owners’ housing needs before, during, and after disasters. Prior to a 
disaster, renters’ household, social, and physical resources have typically been limited 
compared to those of homeowners. When recovering from severe damage from a 




assistance program need to focus more on renters’ needs during a normal period as well 
as after disasters.   
 Chapter III, “Handling Incomplete Tertiary Datasets: Case of 2-1-1 Information 
and Referral Missing Data,” was written about a new method developed to handle 
missing data when merging multiple tertiary datasets. The purpose was to test a model 
for imputing missing data for a key variable in order to conduct multivariate analyses. 
This method was developed in collaboration with Dr. Michael Longnecker and Dr. 
Sherry Bame to solve the problem of missing date information encountered in the Texas 
2-1-1 caller dataset in order to combine the 25 different tertiary Texas 2-1-1 datasets for 
analysis. The approach used a systematic algorithm within the parameters of the missing 
data in comparison to logical assumptions of the comparative data. By applying this 
method, the amount of data available for analysis increased approximately 30 percent, 
thus significantly improving the validity of the findings. Thus, this method may enhance 
opportunities to employ tertiary data for research and management studies, at the same 
time increasing the validity of the findings for more appropriate planning and policies. 
 Chapter IV, “Sheltering, Rental and Ownership Housing Unmet Needs During 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in Texas, 2005,” addressed two issues: the types of unmet 
housing needs most frequently encountered and the time period in which victims need 
the most assistance, according to housing type. As expected, the most vulnerable type of 
unmet housing need during and immediately after a disaster was shelter. Unmet needs 
for rental housing were the most frequent type of needs both before and after the 




financial problems. Homeowners encountered fewer access barriers relating to financial 
issues and getting help for repairs as well as other home modifications. Conclusions 
emphasized the importance of addressing unmet housing needs, particularly those of 
renters, for considerably longer than the immediate disaster phase in order to 
accommodate demands for evacuees’ temporary housing as well as routine housing 
needs of residents in evacuation destinations.  
 This study also provided empirical evidence based on real-time data to support 
Quarantelli’s theoretical model of disaster sheltering and housing (1982, 1995). Findings 
of the longitudinal analysis portrayed peaks in unmet shelter needs occurring right 
before and at hurricane landfall. Before the sheltering phase ended, unmet rental housing 
needs began to increase. Unmet ownership housing needs peaked during the early 
recovery phase. Perhaps shelter needs became easier to meet once evacuees started 
seeking temporary housing or sought more permanent housing to relocate. Until one 
month post-Rita, the volume of unmet shelter needs was still higher than it was before 
the disaster. This may indicate that disaster sheltering and housing phases are ‘mutually 
inclusive’, as has also been stated in the previous literature (Quarantelli, 1982, 1995; 
Neal, 1997).  
 Chapter V, “Community Factors Associated with the Housing Needs of Owners 
vs. Renters During a Disaster: A Case Study of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in Texas,” 
provided a conceptual framework and quantitative multivariate evidence for 
understanding homeowner and renter unmet housing needs before, during, and following 




dimensions found to be significant in previous research examining housing needs during 
normal times. The unmet housing needs, location, and time data were obtained from the 
2005 Texas 2-1-1 dataset and the independent measures were developed from the Texas 
Census and Housing and Urban Development (HUD) public access databases. This 
comprehensive model was tested for renters vs. homeowners over time, including a 
baseline month and three disaster phases covering two hurricanes and 14 weeks post-
landfall of Hurricane Rita.  
 The multivariate logistic regression findings suggested that housing affordability 
and availability factors had a significant impact on homeowner and renter unmet housing 
needs, whereas housing quality had no significant relationship during the disaster study 
period. In the case of unmet rental housing needs, greater affordability barriers were 
associated with greater unmet needs of renters for all disaster phases except recovery, 
where it was hypothesized that federal and state disaster assistance may have helped to 
afford temporary rental housing as well as relocation expenses. Interestingly, housing 
market affordability barriers were significant for homeowners during the baseline period 
but none were significant during the disaster phases. Hence, homeowners may have been 
more resilient to meet their own housing needs or had greater access to disaster financial 
support programs.  
 Availability barriers affected unmet housing needs for both renters and 
homeowners. Unmet housing needs of both were significantly greater in larger urban 
areas during the emergency response phases, with renters still struggling during 




rental units were significantly associated with greater reports of unmet housing needs for 
both homeowners and renters throughout the study period. Less availability of public 
housing was related to homeowners greater unmet housing needs during the short-term 
recovery, whereas fewer Section 8 vouchers was related to renters’ unmet needs only 
during the baseline phase prior to the hurricanes.    
 During Hurricane Rita’s emergency phase, homeowners in the declared disaster 
area had significantly greater likelihood for unmet housing needs than did renters. 
Perhaps this was due to longer delays in disaster locations to recover rental housing 
(Zhang & Peacock, 2010) and/or a tendency of renters to relocate (Peacock, Dash, & 
Zhang, 2007), particularly if their employment was disrupted by the disaster. 
Alternatively, there may have been a surge in rental housing needs beyond the scope of 
the early recovery phase in this study, as many renters remained in temporary shelters or 
were housed in other areas due to unrepaired housing and/or no affordable alternative 
housing in their original place of residence.  
 
Recommendations for Planning, Policy, and Future Research 
 Community planners and policymakers should address affordability barriers for 
rental housing needs during disasters. If the stock of affordable housing is already 
insufficient before disasters, both homeowners and renters will experience significantly 
greater unmet housing needs throughout disaster phases not only in the disaster areas but 
also in evacuation destinations. In disaster areas, as well as evacuation host locations, 




until units in the disaster locations are repaired or rebuilt. Evacuees who lived in 
unsubsidized rental housing faced difficulties from the gap in housing cost between their 
original and host areas. Additional barriers for Katrina victims encountered in Texas 
communities hosting evacuees were ineligibility for subsidized public housing and other 
subsidized support services requiring state residency. These interstate differences 
became problematic not during the emergency response phase when disaster-related 
funding supported housing relief, but rather when individuals sought temporary and 
permanent housing because their original homes and neighborhoods had been 
devastated. Thus, disaster planning and policy making should consider mechanisms to 
facilitate interstate eligibility criteria and emergency funds in order to bridge the gap for 
financial support and housing programs.  
 Policymakers should consider that the types of unmet housing needs for 
homeowners compared to renters are often different, and hence, different strategies and 
programs would be needed. Furthermore, these differences vary during different time 
periods surrounding a disaster. Disaster-related ownership housing needs occurring in 
disaster areas usually involve the repair or rebuilding of damaged housing units. 
Disaster-related rental housing needs, however, occur not only in disaster areas, but also 
in evacuee host areas for temporary housing or relocation. In disaster areas, recovery 
programs would be needed for both homeowners and renters, and in particular for low 
income households in larger urban areas. 
 The results of this study suggest topics for future research. Analyses according to 




needs for disaster sites as well as for evacuation host communities. Comparisons 
between urban and rural areas could offer implications for allocating resources, 
especially for rural communities with limited availability of resources and programs. In 
order to better predict and plan for unmet housing needs, future research is needed to 
analyze the temporal and spatial changes that occur for sheltering and temporary 
housing, especially in terms of tracking unmet needs by disaster phase and location. 
Exploring specific sheltering and housing needs over time can enable more timely and 
focused interventions by emergency managers hoping to more effectively and efficiently 
allocate resources. The importance of also investigating evacuation destination 
community needs would help to enhance community resiliency in supporting disaster 
victims while maintaining support and services for their own residents. Lastly, repeating 
this research approach using 2-1-1 data of other types of disasters in other locations 
would enable greater understanding of factors affecting housing unmet needs in an all-
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CODING INSTRUCTIONS FOR PAPER DATA: Excel Files 
• NEW FILE FOR EACH AIC 
• HAVE HIGHLIGHTER AND STICKY-NOTE FOR QUESTIONS 
• ALL CAPS ONLY 
• LEFT TOP OF PAPER: CODER 3-INITIALS & DATE 
• RIGHT TOP OF PAPER:  VALIDATER 3-INITIALS & DATE 
• SET FOR ' WRAP TEXT"  
• FILE NAME:  INITIALS_AIC_PAPER_DATE.XLS  (E.G.:  SIB_SOUTH-
TX_PAPER_8_29_08.XLS} 
• SEPARATE MULTIPLE INFORMATION WITH A SEMICOLON [ ; ] 
• Log all questions & your decisions so we can go over at team meetings. 
• If demographic information available on more than one client, please see SIB 
• Use "DK" ONLY if the staff or caller stated that on the data record 
• NO BLANK CELLS:  USE "MISS" IF DATA MISSING FOR ANY 
VARIABLE 
• Put "XX" if you & others have a question about the information:  write what you 
think it is & we will search for XX to validate.  
• USE "NA" IF NOT APPROPRIATE TO HAVE DATA IN THAT CELL [e.g., if 
not validated put NA in validation columns] 











BLE HOW COMMENT 9/2/08 UPDATE 9/7/08 UPDATE 







    
B CODE_DATE M/D/YR       




  If OTHER -- write out what other format it is 
D AIC Area Information Center Name 
Can abbreviate, then 
Find/Replace     
E CALLER_ID 
Use caller ID number 
available. If NONE, start at 
1 & continue sequentially 
for all that you code for that 
AIC.   
We will reassign ID after 
validate per AIC.  




If data sheet has its own 
caller numbers, put" AIC-
#'s" [e.g., S-TX-190] 
F CALL_MO Call month: 1-12     
You do not need "0#" if 
single digit 
G CALL_DAY Call date: 1-31     
You do not need "0#" if 
single digit 
H COUNTY NAME / MISS 
DELETE: If out of state, list 
LOCATION, STATE OR 
COUNTRY IN THIS 
COLUMN 
Location: COUNTY NAME 
OR MISS for WHERE THE 
NEED IS 
  
I CITY NAME / MISS If more than one location, list all that are there. 
Log where the need or 
referral should be.   
















ANY COMMENTS RE: 
LOCATION   
LOG ANY LOCATION 
INFORMATION OTHER 
THAN WHERE THE NEED 
IS. INCLUDE ESPECIALLY 
IF INFO RE: WHERE 
FROM.  Include broader 
location info, e.g., Sugarland 
coded in city & Houston area 
coded in INFO_LOCATION 
  
L DIZ 
EVACUEE= written that 
hurricane evacuee; 
DIZ=disaster related but not 
written if evacuee; NO=only 
if written that NOT disaster 
call; MISS=no information 
available 
If you don't know how to code, 
please check w/ Team Leaders 
or SIB 
Code DIZ if yes. Find/replace 
if already coded with Y or 
YES.  
ADD "EVACUEE" if listed 
in the data, so: DIZ; or 
EVACUEE or MISS 
9/23:  "Shelter"= EVACUEE 
[not homeless shelter] 
M K-R 
K=Katrina related / R=Rita / 
MISS=Information missing 
/If OTHER type of disaster -
- write it out  
DELETE: Check w/ SIB if not 
clear. IF LOCATION has 
Louisiana, then list Katrina.  
Code only what's written. Do 
NOT make any assumptions 
of which disaster unless 
"evacuee" & city fits K or R.  
Can code more than one 
hurricane &/or other disaster. 
Separate by semicolon ";" 
9/23:  "Hurricane" 
N NEEDS WORDS OR PHRASES AS WRITTEN 
Explain as close to original 
wording. Include donations. 
Use referral info if need not 
clear. 
Include in NEED -- 
VOLUNTEER or 
DONATION and any further 







# OF NEEDS LISTED       
P AGE YEARS OLD 
If birthdate listed, convert to 
age in 2005 (see cheat-sheet); 
If > 1 listed, include all with";" 
If more than one caller/client 












BLE HOW COMMENT 9/2/08 UPDATE 9/7/08 UPDATE 
Q GENDER M / F / O / MISS 
Male / Female / Other 
(explain) / Missing 
If more than one caller/client 
-- list all info given separated 
by ";" 
  
R RACE W / B / H / A / O / MISS White / Black / Hispanic / Asian / Other (explain) / MISS     
S HSE_SIZE # IN HOUSEHOLD 
# kids / # adults if listed, or 
total 
Use + if some listed but not 
sure how many total.   
U HOH 
FHOH=Female head of 
household; M=Male HOH; 
DK; MISS 
      
T EMPLOYMENT 
FT / PT / SP / UN / RT / 
DSB / MISS 
FT=Full time/ PT=Part time/ 




  List detailed information re: disability.  
V ECON 
Write in info re: economic 
data, e.g., income, food 
stamps, welfare 
      
W OTHER 
Write in other relevant info: 
Check w/ SIB about if 
should include 
      
X VALIDATOR 3 INITIALS 
Put only in cases you validate 
or make changes (XX 
questions); else put "NA" 
  
Validate every 10th OR 
questions (XX), which ever 
comes first. 





write out any comments, 
changes, decisions or 
questions for future re-
coding 






 APPENDIX B 
INFORMATION FOR VALIDATING PAPER CODING 
Purpose: To represent data as closely as possible to what was recorded 
               To make coding decisions consistent 
 
1) Take file of other person  
Other validater 
Other coder 
2) SAVE filename AS CURRENT DATE  -- do NOT change original initials 
Put V_ at front of filename to identify that it is validated:  V_SIB_SOUTH-
TX_PAPER_M_D_YY.XLS 
3) FIND-REPLACE for the whole file: 
Search for BLANK cells 
Validate what it should be 
Report to SB & the original coder 
 Search for EVACUEE 
  If evacuee coded anywhere, change DIZ to DIZ-EVACUEE 
Search for  ABBREVIATIONS as you run across them & change to full names 
in the whole file  [eg, S-TX or STX -> SOUTH-TX; M -> MISS vs. ok if male]. 
Log these & notify SB 
 Careful to not change within text-- Whole cells only. 
 Let us know of any other abbreviations to check 
4) Search for XX -- fix questionable coding. ASK others & SIB ! 
If illegible, code "ILLEG" rather than MISS 
If location confusing, check w/ SB 
If needs confusing, check w/ SB 
5) Start w/ #1 & then check every 10th case carefully for accuracy. 
Ask re: any problems & make post-its to discuss w/ SIB 
Notify SIB of any problems found for other coder or differences from 
your coding 
6) Search for any more ?'s ( "?-" or "?^ (space)" or ?? Or whatever they used) & fix 
or consult w/ SB 
7) If find needs not included, show SB & we'll inform the group of how to decide in 
these cases 
8) Identify any DISABILITY-related information & write details in EMPL (DSB-
wheelchair, DSB-parkinsons).  Ask SB if any questions re: this. 
9) Put validater INITIALS at end of case record; Column X 
Put DATE validated in Column Y 
Put any COMMENTS or decisions made about that case in Column Z 













B) SET UP FILES FOR HS CODING: DSB_AIC_INITIALS_M_D_YY 
 
1) Save as HS_AIC_M_D_YY.xlsx 
 
2) Label the file’s tab as HS-FILE 
 
3) Delete the following COLUMNS / VARIABLES from right to left: 
  [NOTE: THE COLUMN LETTER WILL CHANGE IF YOU DELETE LEFT   
      TO RIGHT] 
  • EVERYTHING TO RIGHT OF Q (ANY_DSB),  
  i.e., INCLUDING R (DSB-COPY) ! AF (DSB_CODE_DATE) 
     
 FILE VARIABLE ORDER 
   A =  MERGE_ID 
   B =  CALL_DATE 
   C =  CODER 
   D =  CODE_DATE 
   E =  MODE 
   F =  AIC 
   G =  CALLER_ID 
   H =  CODE_CO 
   I =   DIZ 
   J =  K-R  
   K =  NEED 
   L =  NUM_NEEDS 
   M =  DSB 
   N =   FEMA 
PREPARING FOR HOUSING CODING 
DONE – JYL 7/9/09 
 
A) SET UP NEEDS-PIVOT TABLE SORTING 
    1)  • In JYL_PIVOT_NEEDS_7_9_09.xls, each worksheet has each AIC’s pivot. 
    • Make two worksheets: one is for electric files, the other is for paper and   
       report files.  
    • Column A: name of AIC, Column B: needs, and Column C: number of needs 




   O =  RED-CROSS 
   P =  SALVATION-ARMY 
   Q=  ANY_DSB 
 
 2) Labels new FOR HOUSING Variable w/ Columns 
   R * HS 
 * = Copy & Insert NEED (column K) & relabel the variable names in Row 1 
  Code NONE, if there is no need related to housing.  
  Keep MISS, if the need is MISS. 
 
   S ** ANY_HS 
   T **  HS-COPY 
 ** = Copy & Insert HS (column R) & relabel the variable names in Row 1 
                  
   U*** HS-DIZ 
 *** = Copy & Insert DIZ (column I) & relabel the variable names in Row 1 
 
   V   SHELTER 
   W  RENTAL-HS 
   X  OWN-HS 
   Y  MOBILE-HS  
   Z  GROUP-HS 
   AA PUBLIC-HS 
   AB  NO-INFO 
   AC  LOW-INCOME 
   AD DISABLED 
   AE  ELDERLY 
   AF  HOMELESS 
   AG CHILDREN 
   AH POP-MISC  
   AI  LOCATION 
   AJ  HS-REHAB 
   AK FINANCIAL 
   AL  HS-INFO 
   AM UTILITY 
   AN HS-GOODS 
   AO HS-MISC 
   AP  HS_CODER 
   AQ HS_CODE_DATE 
 
 
C) Save the prep’d base files in separate folder:    








A) SORT whole file (highlight upper left diamond then sort) by ANY_HS [COLUMN 
S] in ascending order – be sure “HEADER ROW” is highlighted.  
 
 1)  Write the word “HS” in first cell of ANY_HS:  Row 2, Column Q 
  Copy the word “HS” over everything that is NOT: 
   ! MISS 
   !  NONE 
 
 2) In large files, do this down several hundred rows, save, then continue scrolling 
down several hundred rows, save, etc.  
 
  Thus, will have only 3 codes in ANY_HS:   
   • HS 
   • MISS 






 1) Highlight all MISS in HS-COPY column. 
  
 2) Without releasing cursor, go to lower right corner of last MISS cell that is 
highlighted and hold until you get a plus sign + 
 
 3) Drag right the whole set of highlighted MISS through column AO: HS-MISC.  
   • This will fill in the set of cases with MISSING HS for all HS variables.  
   • Check the bottom of the set to make sure all copied and no more than 
should. 
 
 4) Go to the top and Highlight the whole HS-COPY column. 
   • Find / Replace All:  MISS with a number 1 in just the HS-COPY column. 
 
* * * REPEAT < 1 - 4 > FOR “NONE” * * * 
 
  [Remember, HS-COPY is alphabetical, so all “MISS” should be together, and the 
same for all “NONE”.] 
  
 
HOUSING CODING – STEP I: ANY_HS (Column S)  







 • Do pivot table on ANY_HS to get count of HS / NONE / MISS.  
 • Save pivot table in new tab worksheet in this file. 




HS Coding on all X_Group 1 & X_Group 2 files. These should be finished with STEP I:  
 a) set into HS File format, and b) ANY_HS coded.  
 
A) HS Coding Set-up 
 1) Open HS_AIC_your initials_M_D_YY.xlsx.   Now save this file with new date 
and adding your initials to left of existing initials – even if they were yours:  
      Save as HS_AIC_Your Initials_former initials_M_D_YY.xlsx   
 
 2) Leave your file sorted as in STEP-I.  You will be using HS-COPY that should be 
sorted in alphabetical order. 
 
 3) HS_CATEGORIES: Open file JYL_HS_CODE-CAT_8_15_09.xlsx 









   
3 RENTAL-HS 
   
4 OWN-HS 
   
5 MOBILE-HS 
   
6 GROUP-HS 
   
7 PUBLIC-HS 
























! !  
21 HS-MISC 
STOP HERE UNTIL ALL XX_FILES (GROUP 1 & 2) ARE PREP’D 
HS CODING – STEP III:  





  b) There are 3 worksheet tabs in this CODE_CAT file (per 8/15/09): 
   !  HS-CATEGORY:  
    • List of housing categories and variables.   
    
   !  HS-CAT. LOGIC: 
    • Word or phrase describing the types of needs included in the    
                          HS_category. 
    • Alphabetical listing.  
    • This listing is not all inclusive, so if you have suggestions please notify  
           Jee Young & copy Dr. Bame. 
 
   !  JYL_HS-CODE-CAT_8.15.09:  
    • List of all possible HS needs in HS_AIC files categorized to date  
      (8/15/09).  
    • The needs are listed alphabetically exactly as they appear in the  
      datafiles, with spacing and spelling errors.  
 
 4) Files ready to code HS_CAT per 8/16/09: 
 
     AIC X_Group   Type               Number of Merge ID 
   1)  ALAMO 1       electronic  38,549  
   2)  BRAZOS 1       electronic 12,112 
   3)  COASTAL BEND 1       electronic   8,259 
   4) DALLAS A & B 2       report 64,007 & 60,428 
   5)  DEEP EAST 1       report   1,747 
   6) EAST TX 1       electronic 15,331 
   7) FT. WORTH 1       report 38,435   
   8) HEART OF TX 2       electronic   6,280 
   9) HOUSTON x 5 1       electronic  28,841, 29,502, 34,624, 42,983, 36,566 
   10) NORTH EAST 1       electronic   5,135 
   11) NORTH TX 1       paper/report   1,556 
   12) PERMIAN BASIN 2       electronic 25,320 
   13) SOUTH EAST TX 1       electronic      863 
   14) SOUTH PLAINS 2       paper        64 
   15) TEXOMA 1       electronic   4,020 



















  a) In your file, HS_AIC_Your Initials_former initials_M_D_YY.xlsx, start 
alphabetically in column T: HS-COPY: 
   • Copy the HS-need then go to the HS_CODE-CAT file. 
   • You will know where you need to go back to for the next need as you finish 
up one need and change it to a “1” (Step 4) 
 
  Semicolon(s): 
   • Whether more than one need is separated by semicolon(s) or not, Copy the 
whole need. 
 
   NOTE: Paper files had many needs with semicolons but electronic files rarely   
      did.  
   -- If you do not find that exact need, the combination of needs may be listed 
together. Find a portion of that need, reading the listings carefully in the 
HS_CODE-CAT file. Then Paste that revised version from HS_CODE-
CAT file into the HS datafile in that case’s cell under the appropriate 
category.  
 
   -- OR, that need may have been excluded from HS_CAT because it was not 
housing related.  
 
   1) Copy (Ctrl + C) HS need in column “HS-COPY” in your new HS datafile. 
 
   2) Find (Ctrl + F) the category group for that need in HS_CODE-CAT file. 
 
   3) Paste (Ctrl + V) that need into the appropriate variable column in new HS  
datafile for all those cases with that need. 
 
   4) Delete that need in the HS-COPY column by typing a “1” 
    
   5) Find blank (cursor against far left) in each category column and Paste “NO”,   
i.e., there are no HS needs for that category. 
    
   6) If HS-DIZ is “DIZ”, copy HS-COPY column and paste into HS-DIZ column. 
  








a) Sort by AIC & HS-NEED 
   Find what group category that HS-need item is in the CODE-CAT file. 
  
   • Identify the Variable Category’s name at the top (Row 1) where that HS-
item is found. 
   • Do NOT take any categorizing for granted – search out each HS-need 
item and the appropriate Category Variable.   
 
  b) Copy that HS-need item in the CODE-CAT file in your HS-need database file. 
(Easier to just copy again when you find because sometimes Excel will drop 





  a) Paste the word/phrase into the appropriate category’s column for that cell 
(row) in your HS-need datafile.   
      Be careful. Many of the HS-needs have MORE than one category.  
    
    • When you toggle back to your HS-need datafile, you should end up in   
       the cell for that need in the HS-COPY column.   
 
    • Use the right arrow to move curser over to the correct column so you  
       stay in the same row. 
 
  b) Because the HS-COPY column in your HS-need datafile is alphabetical, you 
should be able to just copy-down in the appropriate Category column for all 





  a) Use the arrow to go back to the HS-COPY column for that case (row) for that 
need item.  
 
  b) Delete that need item by typing a “1” in that cell in the HS-COPY column.  
 
   2) Find the category group for that need in HS_CODE-CAT file. 
 
   3) Paste that HS-need item into the appropriate variable category column in your 
 new HS datafile for all those cases with that need.  
  





  c) If there are more than one row of that exact same need item, copy/paste a 
number 1 into each of those cells. [Don’t “copy down” because the 1 will 
change to 2 then 3, etc.] 
 
  d) At the end of coding this file, summing the HS-COPY column will = the 
number of cases in the file (i.e., the last MERGE_ID). This is one of the key 





  a) Fill in blank cells for each HS category column:  
   [Recommend you do one column at a time, especially for the big files.] 
  • Find “  “ – keep this blank, i.e., curser to far left 
   • Paste  “NO” 
  [NOTE: NONE means that there was no need coded for that case for any of the   
HS-need variables vs. NO means that the specific HS variable did not 
have any needs in that category.] 
 
  b) All cells must be filled in with either the word/phrase of the HS item /  MISS /  






C) Check your HS coding when finished 
1) Check for blank cells 
  • Find “  “ – keep this blank, i.e., curser to far left 
  • Fix your mistake. 
 
 2) Check that all HS-needs are coded:  Sum the HS-COPY column [sum($R2:$Ri)]   
  or Highlight the HS-COPY column, you can see the total at the bottom 
   = total number of cases for that file (i.e., the last MERGE_ID #). 
  = the last row number minus one. 
 !  If NOT the same total, then there is something that was not coded. Scroll and 
“eyeball” to find it to fix.  
 
 
   5) Find blank (cursor against far left) in each category column and Paste “NO”,   
i.e., there were no HS needs for that category. 
 





D) Code your INITIALS (HS_CODER: Column AP) and DATE (HS_CODE-
DATE: Column AQ) for those rows that you code.  
  • Keep this up to date if you stop before finished. Even if you stop just for a 
break.  
  • If you do all coding in one sitting, then you can put your initials & date in first 
2 rows, highlight, put curser at lower right and double-click.   
 
  • Scroll down to see if all cells filled in and stopped at the last case.   
  • In the case of MISS and NONE, I already put my initials & date. Leave as it is.  




 1) SAVE with current date.  
 2) Send back HS-CODED FILE to Jee Young & copy Dr. Bame. 
 3) Files will be validated after the first set is coded.  
 4) Be sure to save frequently and to have your files backed up. This is a lot of effort 
and would not like to have you repeat it all because lost a file or corrupted.  
 5) Please send any feedback &/or suggestions re: the coding or ways that may work 
better. 
 
 
 
